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800 
Bail Pending Trial: Changing 
Interpretations of the Bail Reform 
Act and the Importance of Bail 
from Defense Attorneys’ 
Perspectives 
 
Clara Kalhous and John Meringolo* 
 
Introduction: The Importance of Bail for a Criminal Defendant 
 
There is no constitutional right to bail.1 Yet, for an accused 
person facing criminal charges in the United States, 
particularly in the federal system, the denial of bail pending 
trial constructively precludes the effective exercise of those 
rights that are guaranteed by the United States Constitution 
and poses a challenge to attorneys and members of the 
judiciary, each of whom has sworn an oath to protect and 
defend those rights. 
For a federal defendant facing criminal charges, the court’s 
decision to grant or deny bail pending trial has an impact on 
every subsequent stage of the case. An incarcerated defendant 
is substantially less able to assist in his2 own defense than one 
 
* Clara Kalhous graduated from Cardozo School of Law in January 2009 and 
has spent the past three years engaged in the representation of criminal 
defendants in the New York State and the federal courts at all stages of 
pretrial and trial proceedings and on appeal. John Meringolo graduated from 
New York Law School in 1999. Since 2003, he has represented clients in over 
eighty federal cases in District Courts nationwide and in over 300 felony and 
misdemeanor cases in New York and New Jersey state courts. John has 
extensive experience defending clients in high-profile RICO indictments. 
John teaches Trial Advocacy at New York Law School and Advanced Trial 
Advocacy at Pace Law School. His recent publications include The Media, the 
Jury, and the High-Profile Defendant: A Defense Perspective on the Media 
Circus, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1069 (2011). 
1. William Duker, The Right to Bail: A Historical Inquiry, 42 ALB. L. 
REV. 33, 34 (1977). 
2. For legibility and concision the male pronoun is used throughout. 
1
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whose freedom is unrestricted or only conditionally restricted 
by conditions of home confinement. Effectively cut off from 
communication with persons outside the detention facility, the 
incarcerated defendant is unable to arrange meetings with 
witnesses who could testify in his defense, to assist in the 
investigation of his case, or to provide his attorney with the 
facts to support a counter-narrative of the events leading to the 
criminal charge(s) against him. 
Moreover, the restrictions and institutional regulations 
defense attorneys face when visiting clients at detention 
centers impede the attorneys’ abilities to defend their clients 
and, by creating logistical barriers to client contact, impede the 
defense’s ability to fully investigate the facts giving rise to the 
criminal indictment against the client. In a system where nine 
in ten federal criminal cases end in a conviction,3 a denial of 
pretrial release makes it all the more likely that a defendant 
will plead guilty or that he will lose at trial. In addition, 
convicted defendants who were denied bail before trial are 
often sentenced to longer terms of incarceration than 
defendants who were granted pretrial release.4 
Starting from the premise that the court’s decision to grant 
or deny bail has a fundamental impact on the outcome of a 
criminal case, this Article analyzes the question of pretrial 
release on bail from the perspective of the defense attorney, 
with particular emphasis on the current law under the Bail 
Reform Act of 1984 (the “1984 Act”). Part I considers the 
history of bail in common law jurisdictions generally and the 
history of bail in the United States before 1984 in particular, 
with attention to the grounds on which pretrial release was 
granted. Part II examines the legislative history and 
enactment of the 1984 Act and the Act’s effect on pretrial 
 
Bureau of Prison statistics indicate that 93.6 percent of federal inmates are 
male. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, Quick Facts About the Bureau of Prisons, 
http://www.bop.gov/news/quick.jsp (last updated Apr. 21, 2012). However, the 
arguments herein apply with equal force to the situation faced by female 
defendants. 
3. Mark Motivans, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 234184, FEDERAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, 2009, at 2 (2011), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09.pdf. 
4. Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and 
Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REV. 335, 339 n.33 (1990). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/5
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release decisions. Part III discusses the Bail Reform Act from 
defense attorneys’ perspectives and provides an overview 
discussion of the recent decisions to release several high-profile 
defendants on bail on various stringent conditions and 
contrasts those cases with the denial of bail to defendants of 
lesser financial means facing similar charges. Part IV briefly 
considers the alternatives to pretrial detention, including home 
detention, electronic and GPS monitoring, and release on 
recognizance. Throughout, we have incorporated the views of 
prominent defense attorneys whose reflections on their 
experience defending clients who were denied pretrial release 
constitute an important critique of the current system and call 
into question the ability of the Bail Reform Act as applied by 
federal district courts to adequately protect the constitutional 
rights of the accused. 
 
I. The History of Bail 
  
A. The Early English Laws 
 
Bail in the federal system “is rooted in the belief that a 
person who has not yet been convicted of a crime should 
ordinarily not spend any extended period of time in jail.”5 The 
current federal law in the United States, which is said to favor 
pretrial release,6 originated in the Anglo-Saxon system in 
which, until the Assize of Clarendon in 1166, all crimes were 
bailable.7 
Early Anglo-Saxon custom required an accused person to 
provide a suretor whose monetary pledge served to guarantee 
the appearance of the accused at trial as well as the payment of 
the pledged monies to the aggrieved party upon conviction.8 If 
 
5. ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984, H.R. REP. NO. 
98-1121, at 16 (1984). 
6. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (“In our society 
liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the 
carefully limited exception”). But see Motivans, supra note 3, at 2, 10 (at the 
end of the 2009 fiscal year, fifteen percent of federal inmates were pretrial 
detainees; seventy-seven percent of federal defendants in cases that 
terminated in 2009 had been detained pretrial at some point). 
7. Duker, supra note 1, at 44. 
8. Id. at 34-35. It has been noted that the early Anglo-Saxon bail process 
3
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the accused fled, the pledge was forfeited by the suretor.9 
Because the amount of the pledge was equal to the potential 
penalty upon conviction, the “system necessarily linked the 
amount of the pretrial pledge to the seriousness of the crime.”10 
In the eleventh century, the relationship between an accused 
individual and his suretor was converted into a community-
based system in which all free men were required to maintain 
membership in a hundred and a tithing—local government 
units through which groups of men accepted responsibility for 
each others’ actions.11 
Following the Norman Conquest in 1066, the increasing 
use of corporal punishment rather than monetary penalties 
and the “growing delays between accusation and trial” led to 
calls for reform.12 Because crime was no longer punishable by a 
simple fine, the calculation of bail became more complicated.13 
During the eleventh and twelfth centuries, a complex 
system of pretrial release on a series of summons, writs, and 
pledges arose but quickly became rife with abuse; additionally, 
the practice of the “hue and cry,” in which an accused felon was 
executed without trial as soon as he was captured, effectively 
eliminated the rights of the accused.14 In response, the twenty-
ninth chapter of the Magna Carta, signed in 1215, provided 
 
was “perhaps the last entirely rational application of bail. Since the amount 
of the pledge and the possible penalty were identical, the effect of a successful 
escape would have been a default judgment for the amount of the [pledged 
monies]. To the extent the accused left behind sufficient property to pay the 
[pledge], he would have had no incentive for flight. To the extent the surety 
bore the financial responsibility for payment, he had every incentive to 
ensure the appearance of the accused.” June Carbone, Seeing through the 
Emperor’s New Clothes: Rediscovery of Basic Principles in the Administration 
of Bail, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 517, 520 (1983) (footnote omitted). 
9. Duker, supra note 1, at 37-38. 
10. Carbone, supra note 8, at 520. 
11. Duker, supra note 1, at 38-39. This practice was continued following 
the Norman Conquest. Under the Norman code, every free man was required 
to join a “frankpledge” at the age of twelve, a system in which the members 
provided surety for each other. Id. at 39. Failure to apprehend a member of 
one’s frankpledge following wrongdoing by that individual led to collective 
punishment of the group and provided a strong incentive for the maintenance 
of societal order. Id. 
12. ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984, H.R. REP. NO. 
98-1121, at 17 (1984); Carbone, supra note 8, at 522. 
13. Carbone, supra note 8, at 522. 
14. Duker, supra note 1, at 40-43. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/5
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that “No Freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be 
disseised15 of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or to 
be outlawed, or any otherwise destroyed, but by lawful 
Judgment of his Peers, or by the law of the Land.”16 
Nearly simultaneously, at the Assize of Clarendon in 1166, 
the writ de homine replegiando was enacted. The writ 
“commanded the sheriff to release the individual detained 
unless he were held for particular reasons,” thereby 
establishing “the first written list of nonbailable offenses.”17 
The final clause of the writ, which allowed the sheriff to deny 
bail “for any . . . [wrong] for which according to English custom 
he is not replevisable,”18 however, lent itself to abuse by the 
sheriffs. 
In response, in 1275, the English Parliament adopted the 
Statute of Westminster, which classified all offenses for the 
first time as either bailable or nonbailable and mandated 
consideration of the nature of the offense, the probability of 
conviction, and factors including the defendant’s “attempted 
escape, bad repute, or comparable actions or characteristics 
which rendered the offense nonbailable.”19 
Thus, by mandating consideration of the characteristics of 
the accused person and the likelihood of conviction, the Statute 
of Westminster required a preliminary consideration of the 
strength of the evidence against the accused as a proxy for the 
likelihood of flight.20 
The Statute of Westminster remained the governing law 
(with emendations)21 until the Petition of Right in 1628.22 The 
 
15. i.e., be wrongfully dispossessed of his freehold possession of property. 
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 211-12 (2d Pocket ed. 2001). 
16. See Duker, supra note 1, at 43 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
17. Id. at 44. 
18. Id. at 45 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 602 (2d Pocket ed. 2001) (defining “personal 
replevin” as “[a]t common law, an action taken to replevy a person out of 
person or out of another’s custody.”). 
19. Duker, supra note 1, at 45-46; Carbone, supra note 8, at 523; ROBERT 
W. KASTENMEIER, BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984, H.R. REP. No. 98-1121, at 17 
(1984). 
20. Carbone, supra note 8, at 526-27. 
21. H.R. REP. No. 98-1121, at 17. 
22. See generally Duker, supra note 1, at 50-58 (discussing the 
intervening changes to the right to bail). 
5
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Petition was drafted in response to the decision in Darnel’s 
Case,23 in which the courts “upheld the right of the king to jail 
nobles who refused to lend him money, even though they had 
no legal obligation to do so.”24 After intense parliamentary 
negotiations, the King agreed to sign the Petition, which 
“declared and enacted, That no Freeman may be taken or 
imprisoned or be disseised of his freehold or liberties, . . . but 
by lawful judgment of his peers, or by law of the land.”25 The 
Petition of Right failed, however, to state a time limit within 
which an accused person must be released on bail.26 
To eliminate this loophole, in 1677, the Petition of Right 
was amended by the Habeas Corpus Act of 1677, which 
provided that an accused person who was denied bail and 
brought a habeas corpus petition was entitled to have his 
petition heard within three days after the service of the 
petition and that: 
 
[A]fter the Party shall be brought before them, 
the said Lord Chancellor or Lord Keeper, or 
Justice or Baron before whom the Prisoner shall 
be brought . . . , shall discharge the said prisoner 
from his Imprisonment, taking his or their 
Recognizance, with one or more Surety or 
Sureties, in any Sum according to their 
Discretion, having regard to the Quality of the 
Prisoner and Nature of the Offense, for his or 
their Appearance in the Court of the King’s 
Bench . . . unless it shall appear . . . that the 
Party [is] . . . committed . . . for such Matter or 
Offenses for which by law the Prisoner is not 
bailable.27 
 
Thus, the right to bail was secured, but because the 
amount of bail was not constrained in any manner; the 
 
23. 3 How. St. Tr. 1 (1627 K.B.). See generally id. at 58-66 (discussion of 
facts and holding in Darnel’s Case). 
24. H.R. REP. No. 98-1121, at 17 (citing Duker, supra note 1, at 64). 
25. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
26. See Duker, supra note 1, at 65-66. 
27. Id. at 66 (alterations in original) (citation omitted). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/5
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“Discretion” of the person hearing the petition was effectively 
authorized to set prohibitively high bail.28 This last loophole 
was corrected in 1689, with the Bill of Rights, which provided 
that, in criminal cases, “excessive bail ought not to be 
required.”29 
At the dawn of American independence, the English 
common law approach to bail as outlined in the Statute of 
Westminster, the Petition of Right, the Habeas Corpus Act of 
1679, and the Bill of Rights of 1689 provided the framework for 
the American laws.30 
 
B. History of Bail Pending Trial in the U.S. from 1776 to 1966 
 
The colonists brought the English laws with them and “the 
early colonies applied [the Statute of Westminster] verbatim.”31 
Early revisions to the colonies’ bail laws, however, liberalized 
the requirements and the right to bail. For example, in 1641, 
Massachusetts passed a statute providing an “unequivocal 
right to bail for non-capital offenses.”32 Similarly, in 1682, 
Pennsylvania adopted a constitutional provision “providing 
that ‘all Prisoners shall be Bailable by Sufficient Sureties, 
unless for capital Offenses, where proof is evident or the 
presumption great.’”33 Pennsylvania’s formulation of the 
standard for bail―proof evident or presumption great―became 
the model for many states.34 
Throughout this period, considerations of the evidence 
against the accused (i.e., the likelihood of conviction) and of the 
severity of the charged offense remained the most important 
factors in the courts’ bail decisions.35 These factors were 
 
28. Id. 
29. Id. (where “excessive” was not defined). 
30. ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984, H.R. REP. No. 
98-1121, at 18 (1984). 
31. Id.; see also Carbone, supra note 8, at 529. 
32. Carbone, supra note 8, at 530. 
33. Id. at 531 (citing PA. CONST. art. XVI, § 28); Duker, supra note 1, at 
80. 
34. Carbone, supra note 8, at 532; H.R. REP. No. 98-1121, at 19; see also 
Duker, supra note 1, at 80-82 (providing a detailed discussion of the 
individual colonies’ bail statutes). 
35. Carbone, supra note 8, at 540-43. 
7
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effective proxies for the risk of flight—where conviction 
appeared more likely, the presumption that the accused would 
flee was stronger. 
In the early twentieth century, however, courts began to 
additionally consider the defendant’s criminal record when 
setting the amount of bail.36 In 1946, the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure formalized this practice by adopting a 
provision requiring consideration of the defendant’s criminal 
record.37 Thus, consideration of the character and criminal 
record of the defendant, the likelihood of conviction, and the 
severity of the offense, determined whether he was to be 
released on bail and if so, in what amount.38 
In contrast to many state constitutions, the Constitution of 
the United States does not guarantee the right to bail.39 The 
Eighth Amendment provides only that “Excessive bail shall not 
be required.”40 Although not constitutionally guaranteed, bail 
protects the interests of the public and the interests of the 
defendant “if the government can be assured of [the 
defendant’s] presence” in court.41 The mandate that “a person 
accused of crime shall not, until he has been finally adjudged 
guilty in the court of last resort, be absolutely compelled to 
undergo imprisonment or punishment”42 reinforces the 
presumption of innocence.43 
 
The right to bail in non-capital cases is preserved in the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, however, which provides that: 
 
[U]pon all arrests in criminal cases, bail shall be 
admitted, except where the punishment may be 
 
36. Id. at 546. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 547-48. The courts retained substantial discretion in the 
decision to grant or deny bail based on the character of the defendant and his 
criminal record. See Duker, supra note 1, at 69. 
39. Carbone, supra note 8, at 533. 
40. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
41. United States v. Barber, 140 U.S. 164, 167 (1891). 
42. Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285 (1895). 
43. Duker, supra note 1, at 68 (“This traditional theory, corollary to the 
notion of presumption of innocence, theoretically permits the accused to aid 
his counsel in the preparation of a defense.”). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/5
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death, in which cases it shall not be admitted but 
by the Supreme or a circuit court, or by a justice 
of the Supreme Court, or a judge of the district 
court, who shall exercise their discretion therein, 
regarding the nature and circumstances of the 
offense, and of evidence, and the usages of law.44 
 
Whether or not this language actually guarantees the right 
to bail is still debated.45 In Stack v. Boyle,46 the Supreme Court 
wrote: 
 
[The] traditional right to freedom before 
conviction permits the unhampered preparation 
of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction 
of punishment prior to conviction. . . . Unless this 
right to bail before trial is preserved, the 
presumption of innocence, secured only after 
centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning.47 
 
Later in that same term, however, the Court also wrote in 
dicta that: 
 
The [Eighth Amendment’s] bail clause was lifted 
with slight changes from the English Bill of 
Rights Act. In England that clause has never 
been thought to accord a right to bail in all cases, 
but merely to provide that bail shall not be 
excessive in those cases in which it is proper to 
 
44. Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, § 33, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789). 
45. ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984, H.R. REP. NO. 
98-1121, at 19 (1984); see also United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1326 
(D.C. 1981) (“The history of the Eighth Amendment . . . is generally 
unilluminating and falls short of supporting, let alone compelling, the 
conclusion that a right to bail must be found by implication.”). 
46. 342 U.S. 1 (1951). 
47. Id. at 4 (citation omitted). The question before the Court concerned 
whether bail set at fifty thousand dollars for defendants accused of violating 
the Smith Act, 54 Stat. 670 (1940) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 18 U.S.C.), was “excessive.” The Court held that “[b]ail set at a figure 
higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill [the] purpose [of 
assuring appearance at trial] is ‘excessive’ under the Eighth Amendment.” 
Stack, 342 U.S. at 5; see also H.R. REP. NO. 98-1121, at 20. 
9
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grant bail. When this clause was carried over 
into our Bill of Rights, nothing was said that 
indicated any different concept. The Eighth 
Amendment has not prevented Congress from 
defining the classes of cases in which bail shall 
be allowed in this country. Thus in criminal 
cases bail is not compulsory where the 
punishment may be death. Indeed, the very 
language of the Amendment fails to say all 
arrests must be bailable.48 
 
If bail is granted, however, the Eighth Amendment’s 
guarantee that bail shall not be “excessive” applies. Despite the 
longstanding prohibition on imposing excessive bail, the 
question of what was excessive was not always understood to 
refer to the monetary amount of bond imposed.49 In the colonial 
period, the financial circumstances of the accused were not 
considered when bail was set.50 Indeed, the state courts 
considered that the imposition of bail calculated according to 
the accused’s ability to pay would be unjust.51 
In 1835, the District Court of the District of Columbia 
redefined the concept of “excessive” bail, holding that: 
 
[T]o require larger bail than the prisoner could 
give would be to require excessive bail and to 
deny bail in a case clearly bailable by law. . . . 
[T]he discretion of the magistrate in taking bail 
in a criminal case, is to be guided by the 
compound consideration of the ability of the 
prisoner to give bail, and the atrocity of the 
offence.52 
 
48. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545-46 (1952). The Court limited 
its holding to deportation cases but found that aliens being deported could be 
held without bail. Id.; see also Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1330 (“Lower courts 
have relied, alternatively, on the dicta of both Carlson and Stack to find or 
deny a constitutional right to bail, but without any convincing resolution.”). 
49. See Carbone, supra note 8, at 548-49. 
50. Id. at 548. 
51. Id. at 549 (quoting People v. Goodwin, 18 Johns. 187 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1820)). 
52. Carbone, supra note 8, at 549 (citing United States v. Lawrence, 26 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/5
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Still, before the Bail Reform Act of 1966 (the “1966 Act”), 
the gravity of the charged offense was the most important 
consideration for the court and the defendant’s financial 
circumstances were considered “only within limits dictated by 
the seriousness of the offense.”53 
 
C. The Bail Reform Act of 1966 
 
During the decade preceding the enactment of the 1966 
Act, studies by Caleb Foote54 and others55 demonstrated that 
courts were rarely influenced by the defendant’s financial 
resources in setting the amount of bail and that many 
defendants remained in pretrial detention because they were 
unable to post bond.56 In response, the Manhattan Bail Project 
at the Vera Institute of Justice57 attempted to create an 
alternative mechanism for determining which defendants 
should be detained before trial, working from the premise that 
the risk of flight was the sole rationale for a denial of bail.58 
The Manhattan Bail Project’s analysis of individual defendants’ 
ties to the community successfully halved the number of 
individuals released on their own recognizance (i.e., with no 
monetary bond) who subsequently failed to appear for trial.59 
In response, Congress passed the 1966 Act, which “codified 
a presumption in favor of pretrial release, prescribed non-
monetary conditions of release as an alternative to bail bonds, 
and added ‘community ties’ as a new element to be weighed in 
setting the conditions of release.”60 Under the 1966 Act, all 
defendants other than those facing a potential capital sentence 
were entitled to be released on their own recognizance unless 
 
F. Cas. 887, 888 (C.C.D.D.C. 1835) (No. 15,577)). 
53. Carbone, supra note 8, at 552. 
54. See CALEB C. FOOTE, STUDIES ON BAIL 190 (1966). 
55. See Carbone, supra note 8, at 552 nn.178-79. 
56. Id. at 552. 
57. See VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, PROGRAMS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: VERA 
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE TEN-YEAR REPORT, 1961-1972 (1972). 
58. Carbone, supra note 8, at 552-53. 
59. Id. at 553. 
60. Id. (citing Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 3146(b), 80 
Stat. 214 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b) (2006)). 
11
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the court determined that the release “[would] not reasonably 
assure” the defendant’s presence at trial.61 If the court found 
that release on recognizance would not assure the defendant’s 
appearance as required, the 1966 Act provided a series of 
conditions that could be imposed, including: 
 
[P]lacing the person in the custody of a 
designated person or organization which agrees 
to the supervision; restrictions on travel, 
association and/or residence; execution of a bail 
bond with a sufficient number of solvent sureties; 
and finally the imposition of any other condition 
deemed reasonably to assure appearance as 
required, including a condition requiring that the 
person return to custody after specified hours.62 
 
In making the determination of what conditions were 
reasonably necessary to assure the defendant’s appearance as 
required, courts employed the Manhattan Bail Project’s 
criteria, as well as the more “traditional” criteria of the weight 
of evidence against the accused and his criminal history.63 
Thus, until 1984, the “gravity of the offense” established the 
contours of the decision to grant or deny bail and provided a 
framework for a determination of the amount of bail that 
 
61. ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984, H.R. REP. NO. 
98-1121, at 21 (1984). This and similar citations in this section refer to the 
Bail Reform Act of 1966. The referenced provisions of the U.S. Code have 
been amended by the Bail Reform Act of 1984. Defendants facing capital 
charges were eligible for release on the same conditions “unless the judicial 
officer has reason to believe that no such condition(s) will reasonably assure 
that a particular defendant will not flee or pose a danger to any other person 
or to the community.” Id. at 21-22. 
62. Id. at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted). In 1982, the 1966 Act 
was amended by the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, which added 
the possibility of pretrial release on the condition that a defendant did not 
violate federal obstruction of justice statutes. Id. at 22. 
63. Id. at 21. These “traditional” criteria included, “the nature and 
circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence against the 
accused, the accused’s family ties, employment, financial resources, character 
and mental condition, the length of his residence in the community, his 
record of convictions, and his record of appearance at court proceedings or of 
flight to avoid prosecution or failure to appear at court proceedings.” Id. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/5
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courts considered reasonable.64 
 
D. The District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal 
Procedure Act of 1970 
 
Under the United States Constitution,65 Congress has 
legislative jurisdiction over the District of Columbia. In the 
1960s, following the enactment of the federal 1966 Act, 
Congress reworked the District of Columbia Code, authorizing 
preventive pretrial detention in noncapital cases on grounds 
either that the accused was likely to pose a danger to the 
community or a risk of flight for the first time.66 Pretrial 
detention was authorized for individuals charged with: 
 
[C]ertain defined dangerous crimes who could be 
a threat to the safety of the community; (2) those 
charged with a crime of violence who have been 
convicted of such a crime within the immediate 
preceding ten year period, or those who were on 
bail or other release pending completion of a 
sentence; and (3) those charged with any offense 
who, for the purpose of obstructing or attempting 
to obstruct justice, threaten, injure, intimidate or 
attempt to threaten injure or intimidate any 
prospective witness or juror.67 
 
The law also provided for a detention hearing procedure at 
which the judicial officer was instructed to release the 
individual on bail unless the officer found by clear and 
convincing evidence that he fell into one of the enumerated 
categories; that “there [was] no condition or combination of 
conditions or release which [would] reasonably assure the 
safety of any other persons or the community,” taking various 
factors into consideration; and “with the exception of those in 
the third category, supra, that there [was] a substantial 
 
64. Carbone, supra note 8, at 541. 
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
66. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1121, at 22. 
67. Id. 
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probability that the accused committed the offense for which he 
[was] present before the judicial officer.”68 
The Code’s preventive detention measure was challenged, 
but ultimately upheld by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia, which reasoned that the provision 
was regulatory, not punitive, because it “was not intended to 
promote either of the ‘traditional aims of punishment 
retribution and deterrence.’”69 The preventive detention 
provision and other sections of the District of Columbia Code, 
regarding the admissibility of evidence at the detention 
hearing and the representation by counsel, formed the 
background against which Congress deliberated when 
reforming the 1966 Act. 
 
II. The Bail Reform Act of 1984 
 
Following the enactment of the 1966 Act, it became clear 
that the risk of flight alone was an inadequate ground on which 
to base the bail decision. Moreover, when Congress was 
debating enactment of the 1984 reforms, Representative 
Kastenmeier noted in his report to the House Judiciary 
Committee that, since passage of the 1966 Act, the judiciary 
had adopted a de facto consideration of dangerousness “by 
denominating defendants as flight risks and setting a high bail. 
. . . One study estimate[d] that about two-thirds of those 
eligible for detention under the Senate bail bill [that became 
the 1984 Act] [were] already detained.”70 Thus, federal courts 
were taking matters into their own hands, effectively denying 
bail in cases where they deemed defendants to be dangerous by 
setting inordinately high bail, albeit on stated grounds of risk 
of flight. 
In the spring of 1982, President Reagan began pressing for 
congressional action on a number of anticrime proposals 
including bail reform. He urged Congress to “set an example for 
the States by establishing a modern, effective criminal justice 
 
68. Id. 
69. United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1332-33 (D.C. 1981) 
(quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963)). 
70. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1121, at 10-11. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/5
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system,” by passing proposed legislation that would include 
“reform of our bail laws so that a judge, after a hearing with 
full due process protections, can prevent a dangerous defendant 
from returning to the streets to prey once again on innocent 
citizens. It would permit a judge to set reasonable conditions 
for pretrial release and to lock up any defendant who is 
rearrested while out on bail.”71 
 
A. President Reagan’s Anticrime Proposals 
 
Congressional work on the law that would become the 1984 
Act began when President Reagan’s Attorney General’s task 
force on crime and the Senate Judiciary Committee developed 
an omnibus anticrime bill and sent it to Congress for 
consideration in 1982.72 Thereafter, however, the proposals 
were not immediately taken up, and, on February 18, 1984, 
President Reagan addressed the nation, urging Congress to 
act.73 In his address, the President argued that “too many of 
our friends and loved ones live in fear of crime. . . . For too 
many years, the scales of criminal justice were tilted toward 
protecting rights of criminals. . . . The liberal approach of 
coddling criminals didn’t work and never will.”74 Describing the 
bail reforms, the President said: 
 
It’s hard to imagine the present system being 
any worse. Except in capital cases, Federal 
courts cannot consider the danger a defendant 
may pose to others if released. The judge can 
only consider whether it’s likely the defendant 
will appear for trial if granted bail. Recently, a 
man charged with armed robbery and suspected 
 
71. President Ronald Reagan, Statement on Proposed Anticrime 
Legislation (May 26, 1982), available at 
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/52682b.htm. 
72. See President Ronald Reagan, Remarks to Reporters Announcing 
Proposed Criminal Justice Reform Legislation (Sept. 13, 1982), available at 
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/91382b.htm. 
73. See President Ronald Reagan, Radio Address to the Nation on 
Proposed Crime Legislation (Feb. 18, 1984), available at 
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1984/21884a.htm. 
74. Id. 
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of four others was given a low bond and quickly 
released. Four days later he and a companion 
robbed a bank, and in the course of the robbery a 
policeman was shot. This kind of outrage 
happens again and again, and it must be 
stopped. So, we want to permit judges to deny 
bail and lock up defendants who the government 
has shown pose a grave danger to their 
communities.75 
 
The President’s inflammatory example, which implied that 
an arrest could be a proxy for guilt, reflected the deep 
dissatisfaction with the 1966 Act’s reliance on risk of flight and 
preyed on increasing fears of criminal activity within American 
communities.76 
 
B. Congressional Debates and Legislative Enactment 
 
Based on experience with the 1966 Act and in reaction to 
the public’s perception that crime was increasing across 
America, Congress’s overwhelming rationale for the 1984 Act 
was the desire to increase judicial discretion to detain 
individuals based on a perceived danger to the community.77 As 
 
75. Id. 
76. In a speech on the floor of the House in August 1984, Representative 
Lungren admonished his colleagues for having ignored the President’s 
anticrime proposals for fifty-one weeks, and cited a report in USA TODAY that 
sixty-two percent of readers described themselves as “very worried” about 
crime, while only fifty-two percent described themselves as “very worried” 
about nuclear war. 130 CONG. REC. H23,592-93 (daily ed. Aug. 9, 1984) 
(statement of Rep. Lungren). Similarly, Representative Hoyer cited statistics 
from a U.S. Department of Justice report from September 1983 that in 1982, 
“there was one murder every [twenty-five] minutes, one rape every [seven] 
minutes, one robbery every [fifty-nine] seconds, and one burglary every [nine] 
seconds.” 130 CONG. REC. H10,807 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1984) (statement of Rep. 
Hoyer). 
77. S. REP. NO. 98-225 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 
3185, 1983 WL 25404, at *3: 
 
Many of the changes in the Bail Reform Act incorporated in 
this bill reflect the Committee’s determination that federal 
bail laws must address the alarming problem of crimes 
committed by persons on release and must give the courts 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/5
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Representative Kastenmeier wrote: 
 
In 1966, the Congress made an explicit decision 
not to permit the courts to assess directly 
whether the defendant was dangerous. . . . Since 
1966, there has been continued pressure for the 
use of pretrial detention based on predictions of 
dangerousness. During this [fifteen]-year period, 
some additional evidence has emerged which 
may help resolve the issues outlined above. The 
pressure for preventive detention has produced 
changes in the bail laws in a number of states 
and passage of a bail reform bill by the Senate.78 
 
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary agreed, reporting 
that “[c]onsiderable criticism has been leveled at the Bail 
Reform Act [of 1966] in the years since its enactment because 
of its failure to recognize the problem of crimes committed by 
those on pretrial release.”79 
During the period leading to the enactment of the 1984 
Act, the House Committee on the Judiciary held three days of 
hearings on bail reform, seeking to establish through expert 
testimony from the Judicial Conference of the United States, 
the Pretrial Resource Center, the Reagan Administration, the 
American Bar Association, the American Civil Liberties Union, 
and academic experts, the “nature and extent of pretrial crime 
in the Federal criminal justice system,” and which of the 
proposed legislative measures would be most effective, least 
costly (both financially and humanly), and would pose the 
fewest constitutional problems.80 
 
 
adequate authority to make release decisions that give 
appropriate recognition to the danger a person may pose to 
others if released. 
 
Id. 
78. ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984, H.R. REP. NO. 
98-1121, at 10 (1984) (footnotes omitted). 
79. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 5. 
80. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1121, at 9. 
17
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In his written report to the House Judiciary Committee 
summarizing the hearings, Representative Kastenmeier 
characterized the “question of whether dangerousness should 
be a sufficient justification for pretrial detention” as “the single 
most difficult bail issue.”81 He presciently noted, inter alia, that 
opponents of preventive pretrial detention found that 
“predictive pretrial detention should be minimized because of 
the negative impact detention has on trial outcome and 
sentence (all other things being equal, detainees are more 
likely to be convicted and, once convicted, receive longer 
sentences).”82 
When the legislation containing the 1984 Act came to the 
House floor for debate, Representative Kastenmeier spoke 
against the bail reform provisions as written, saying, “Title I of 
this bill radically changes bail practices in this country by 
authorizing preventive detention. While I recognize that fear of 
crime and the public concern about crimes committed on 
pretrial release motivate these provisions, these changes are 
ill-founded and possibly unconstitutional.”83 Specifically, he 
argued that the bill “may violate the eighth amendment right 
to bail. Second, the bill may violate the due process 
requirements of the fifth amendment.”84 
Representative Kastenmeier’s view gained support from 
Representative Rodino, who agreed that allowing pretrial 
detention based on predictions of dangerousness went “too 
far,”85 and from Representative Conyers, who said that, 
“[w]hen we authorize preventive detention in an 
unconstitutional way to permit the Federal courts to lock up a 
person without a finding of guilt based on the judge’s guess 
about the person’s future behavior, I think we have a 
constitutional problem.”86 Nonetheless, the House passed the 
measure, which Representative Sawyer called “one tremendous 
 
81. Id. at 11. 
82. 130 CONG. REC. H10,811 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1984) (statement of Rep. 
Robert Kastenmeier). 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at n.1. 
85. 130 CONG. REC. H10,810 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1984) (statement of Rep. 
Peter Rodino). 
86. 130 CONG. REC. H10,813 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1984) (statement of Rep. 
John Conyers). 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/5
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crime bill . . . [and] the biggest crime bill ever passed in 
history.”87 
In the Senate, the rhetoric was much more favorable. The 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary’s report noted the “deep 
public concern, which the Committee shares, about the growing 
problem of crimes committed by persons on release.”88 The 
Committed cited a report that one out of every six defendants 
released pretrial was rearrested during the pretrial period, and 
one third of those were rearrested more than once.89 Thus, the 
Committee wrote: 
 
[T]here is a small but identifiable group of 
particularly dangerous defendants as to whom 
neither the imposition of stringent release 
conditions nor the prospect of revocation of 
release can reasonably assure the safety of the 
community or other persons. It is with respect to 
this limited group of offenders that the courts 
must be given the power to deny release pending 
trial.90 
 
On October 4, 1984, the Senate adopted the Thurmond 
Amendment No. 7043, which included a number of major 
amendments to federal criminal law including “bail and 
sentencing reform, forfeiture of drug assets, improvements in 
the insanity defense, increased drug penalties, surplus Federal 
property improvements, labor racketeering provisions, prison 
construction assistance, missing children provisions, Federal 
assistance to state crime victim compensation programs, and 
trademark counterfeiting, credit card fraud, armed career 
criminals and terrorism provisions.”91 In his remarks, Senator 
Thurmond noted that: 
 
87. 130 CONG. REC. H11,981 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984) (statement of Rep. 
Thomas Sawyer); 130 CONG. REC. H11,981 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984) (statement 
of Rep. Neal Smith). 
88. S. REP. NO. 98-225 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 
3188, 1983 WL 25404, at *6. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 6-7. 
91. H.R.J. Res. 648, 98th Cong. (1984) (enacted). 
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[T]he crime problem is a high priority for the 
American people and, thus, should receive 
prompt and effective attention on the part of 
their elective representatives. The crime package 
that we are offering today is a result of many 
years of hard work and dedication on the part of 
Members of Congress and individuals in the 
executive branch. Let me emphasize to my 
colleagues on both sides of the Capitol dome-this 
is a bipartisan effort that cuts across liberal and 
conservative lines.”92 
 
In concurrence, Senator Biden called the bill a bipartisan 
effort, and noted that earlier versions of the Comprehensive 
Crime Control Act of 1984 had been passed by overwhelming 
majorities in both the House and the Senate, stating that “[t]he 
enactment of this crime legislation should not be a partisan 
issue. Crime is not a Democratic issue or a Republican issue.”93 
Senator Laxalt praised the legislation, saying: 
 
The reforms made by this legislation are well-
considered responses to a serious crime problem 
in our Nation. When this package is signed into 
law, criminals who are found to be dangerous 
will no longer be free on bail to walk to streets 
and commit other crimes . . . . [S]uffice it to say 
that all of the reforms are essential to reshape 
our Federal criminal justice system. These 
changes will go a long way toward making this 
system one which is truly just.”94 
 
Senator Kennedy called the bail reform provisions of the 
Act, “historic . . . far reaching, and . . . urgently needed.” He 
continued: 
 
92. 130 CONG. REC. S13,062 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1984) (statement of Sen. 
Strom Thurmond). 
93. 130 CONG. REC. S13,063 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1984) (statement of Sen. 
Joseph Biden). 
94. 130 CONG. REC. S13,078 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1984) (statement of Sen. 
Paul Laxalt). 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/5
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The most important provision is the change that 
at last permits judges to take into account the 
potential dangerousness of defendants in 
deciding whether they should be released on bail. 
No longer will judges be faced with the Hobson’s 
choice of granting bail to a demonstrably 
dangerous defendant, or subverting the law with 
a baseless finding that the defendant is likely to 
flee. No longer will any judge feel compelled by a 
foolish law to release a dangerous defendant into 
a community to rape or rob or mug or kill again. 
 
There are also important companion changes in 
the existing law on money bail. The act prohibits 
the use of money bail as a means to assure a 
defendant’s appearance at trial, and limits the 
amount of bail to the defendant’s ability to pay. 
No longer will rich defendants be released 
because they can afford to post their bail, while 
the poor remain in jail. 
 
* * * * 
 
In sum, this legislation embodies a unique 
national consensus that more can be done and 
must be done to combat crime in our society. The 
bill we offer today is a giant step forward for the 
safety of our communities, for the preservation of 
our freedoms, and for every law enforcement 
officer, every criminal justice official, and every 
citizen in America.95 
 
Senator Leahy noted that, “[o]ur bail laws, both Federal 
and State, have failed to give adequate consideration to how 
much danger is posed to the community by particular bail 
conditions. This bill allows a judge to evaluate a danger to the 
 
95. 130 CONG. REC. S13,079 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1984) (statement of Sen. 
Edward Kennedy). 
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community. It is a change that is long overdue.”96 He 
cautioned, however, that “the strengthening of our Federal bail 
law implies a strong duty to ensure a speedy trial. . . . Judges 
should embrace the bail standards in this bill, but should use 
their considerable powers to see to it that those who are denied 
bail because of danger to the society are promptly tried. . . . 
Curbs on bail are curbs on the personal liberty of the accused. 
The need for bail is deeply rooted in the presumption of 
innocence.”97 
 
Despite evidence that the proportion of federal defendants 
released on bail and rearrested for subsequent criminal activity 
was very low,98 Congress’s stated rationale—to protect the 
public—was adopted and accepted by the Supreme Court in the 
first case to challenge the constitutionality of the 1984 Act’s 
preventive detention provisions.99 
 
 
 
96. 130 CONG. REC. S13,088 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1984) (statement of Sen. 
Patrick Leahy). 
97. Id. 
98. ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984, H.R. REP. 98-
1121, at 11 (1984) (“At the Federal level, in 10 demonstration districts [using 
expanded pretrial supervision], the pretrial arrest rate for releasees was 
reduced to 4.7% and only 2.4% are charged with a new felony”). 
 
An early study done by the Harvard Civil Rights and Civil 
Liberties Law review found that if the criteria of the D.C. 
preventive detention statute were applied in Boston, for 
every correct prediction (i.e. an incarceration of the person 
would have prevented the offense) seven persons would 
have been incorrectly jailed, thus, tripling the detention 
population. Two more recent studies (one national and one 
of the District of Columbia) indicate that using the best 
available predictive device would result in at least as many 
incorrect predictions as correct ones. Moreover, the national 
study found that a 16% reduction in pretrial crime would 
result in an increase of 30% in the detention population. 
The most recent study using Federal data found that 93% 
eligible for detention would, if released, not commit a new 
offense. Thus, finding the dangerous 7% is a formidable 
task. 
 
Id. at n.11. 
99. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742 (1987). 
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C. Pretrial Detention for Dangerousness or Risk of Flight 
Under the 1984 Act 
 
Pursuant to the 1984 Act,100 the court “shall order the 
pretrial release of [a defendant] on personal recognizance, or 
upon execution of an unsecured appearance bond . . . unless the 
[court] determines that such release will not reasonably assure 
the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the 
safety of any other person or the community.”101 
If the court determines that release on personal 
recognizance or unsecured bond poses a risk of nonappearance 
or of danger to the community, the court “shall order the 
pretrial release of the person . . . subject to the least restrictive 
. . . condition, or combination of conditions, that . . . will 
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required 
and the safety of any other person and the community . . . .”102 
Only if the court finds after a hearing that “no condition or 
combination of conditions will reasonably assure the 
appearance of the person as required and the safety of any 
other person and the community” shall the court detain the 
defendant pending trial.103 A finding that no conditions will 
reasonably assure “the safety of any other person and the 
community” must be supported by clear and convincing 
 
100. 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2006). 
101. Id. § 3142(b). 
102. Id. § 3142(c)(1)(B). The specific conditions, which are enumerated in 
18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(i)-(xiv), include release to custody of a designated 
person who will assure the defendant’s appearance; that the defendant 
maintain or seek employment; maintain or seek education; abide by specific 
restrictions on personal associations, place of abode, or travel; avoid all 
contact with alleged victims and potential witnesses; report regularly to 
pretrial services; comply with an imposed curfew; refrain from possession of a 
firearm, destructive device, or other dangerous weapon; refrain from 
excessive use of alcohol or any use of narcotic drugs without a prescription; 
undergo medical, psychological, or psychiatric treatment as mandated; agree 
to forfeiture of property or money for failure to appear as required; execute a 
bail bond with sufficient sureties to reasonably assure the court of 
appearance; return to custody for specified hours following release for 
employment, education, or other limited purposes; and satisfy “any other 
condition that is reasonably necessary to assure the appearance of the person 
as required and to assure the safety of any other person and the community. 
Id. 
103. Id. § 3142(e)(1). 
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evidence.104 A finding that the defendant poses a risk of flight 
must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence.105 The 
burden of proof rests with the government. 
If a defendant is accused of 
 
(A) a crime of violence, [sex trafficking of 
children], or [an act of terrorism transcending 
national boundaries] . . . for which a maximum 
term of imprisonment of 10 years or more is 
prescribed; (B) an offense for which the 
maximum sentence is life imprisonment or 
death; (C) a[] [controlled substances] offense for 
which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten 
years or more is prescribed . . .[,]106 
 
or if the defendant is accused of any felony and has 
previously been convicted of two or more such offenses in 
federal or state courts,107 or if the case involves “any felony that 
is not otherwise a crime of violence that involves a minor 
victim or that involves the possession or use of a firearm or 
destructive device . . . or any other dangerous weapon . . . [,]”108 
a rebuttable presumption arises that “no condition or 
combination of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of 
any other person and the community.”109 
In deciding “whether there are conditions of release that 
will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as 
required and the safety of any other person and the 
community[,]” the 1984 Act instructs the court to consider: 
 
(1) [T]he nature and circumstances of the offense 
charged, including whether the offense is a crime 
of violence . . . or involves a . . . firearm, 
explosive, or destructive device; (2) the weight of 
the evidence against the person; (3) the history 
 
104. Id. § 3142(f)(2)(B). 
105. United States v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1985). 
106. 18 U.S.C. §3142(f)(1)(A)-(C) (citations omitted). 
107. Id. § 3142(f)(1)(D). 
108. Id. § 3142(f)(1)(E). 
109. Id. § 3142(e)(2). 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/5
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and characteristics of the person . . . ; and . . . (4) 
the nature and seriousness of the danger to any 
person or the community that would be posed by 
the person’s release.110 
 
Because the 1984 Act favors pretrial release, “it is only a 
limited group of offenders who should be denied bail pending 
trial.”111 
 
D. The Supreme Court’s Constitutional Analysis of the 1984 
Act 
 
In 1987, the Supreme Court considered the preventive 
detention provisions of the 1984 Act and found them 
constitutional in United States v. Salerno.112 Anthony Salerno 
and Vincent Cafaro were charged in a twenty-nine-count 
indictment that alleged, inter alia, thirty-five acts of 
racketeering activity including conspiracy to commit murder. 
Salerno was alleged to be the “boss” of the Genovese crime 
family, and Cafaro was alleged to be a “captain” in the same 
family.113 The government moved for detention, proffering 
evidence obtained through wiretaps and offering the testimony 
of two of its trial witnesses.114 In return, Salerno offered 
testimony from character witnesses and medical evidence in 
the form of a letter from his doctor. Both Salerno and Cafaro 
challenged the reliability of the government’s evidence and the 
credibility of the witnesses.115 
The District Court for the Southern District of New York 
granted the government’s detention motion, concluding that 
the 1984 Act’s requirements had been met and that “the 
Government had established by clear and convincing evidence 
that no condition or combination of conditions of release would 
 
110. Id. § 3142(g). 
111. United States v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. Shakur, 817 F.2d 189, 195 
(2d Cir. 1987)). 
112. 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
113. Id. at 743. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
25
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ensure the safety of the community or any person”116 because: 
 
The activities of a criminal organization such as 
the Genovese Family do not cease with the arrest 
of its principals and their release on even the 
most stringent of bail conditions. . . . When 
business as usual involves threats, beatings, and 
murder, the present danger such people pose in 
the community is self-evident.117 
 
The defendants appealed the detention order, and the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed 
that, “to the extent that the Bail Reform Act permits pretrial 
detention on the ground that the arrestee is likely to commit 
future crimes, it is unconstitutional on its face.”118 The Second 
Circuit reasoned that “our criminal law system holds persons 
accountable for past actions, not anticipated future actions [,]” 
and that “the Government could not, consistent with due 
process, detain persons who had not been accused of any crime 
merely because they were thought to present a danger to the 
community.”119 
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit in a six-to-
three decision and found the 1984 Act’s preventive detention 
provisions constitutional.120 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion 
for the Court began by noting that the 1984 Act had been 
enacted in response to “the alarming problem of crimes 
committed by persons on release.”121 On that basis, the Court 
held that the 1984 Act did not violate the Due Process Clause 
either substantively or procedurally.122 The Court 
characterized the preventive detention provision as “regulatory 
in nature” and found that it did “not constitute punishment 
 
116. Id. at 743-44. 
117. Id. at 744 (citing United States v. Salerno, 631 F. Supp. 1364, 1375 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986)). 
118. Id. (referencing United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 
1986)). 
119. Id. at 744-45. 
120. Id. at 740. 
121. Id. at 742 (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 3 (1983), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3185, 1983 WL 25404, at *3). 
122. Id. at 746-52. 
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before trial in violation of the Due Process Clause.”123 Praising 
Congress’s “careful delineation of the circumstances under 
which detention will be permitted,” the Court wrote, “When the 
Government proves by clear and convincing evidence that an 
arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat to an 
individual or the community, we believe that, consistent with 
the Due Process Clause, a court may disable the arrestee from 
executing that threat.”124 
The Court also found that the 1984 Act did not violate the 
Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Bail Clause.125 Referencing its 
earlier decisions in Stack v. Boyle126 and Carlson v. Landon,127 
the Court held that, “when Congress has mandated detention 
on the basis of a compelling interest other than prevention of 
flight, as it has here, the Eighth Amendment does not require 
release on bail.”128 
Thus, since the Court’s holding in Salerno, federal district 
courts are authorized to order the pretrial detention of 
defendants based on a perceived risk of flight, or a danger to 
the community. The following sections of this Article examine 
how the 1984 Act’s detention provisions affect the ability of 
criminal defense attorneys to defend their clients and how 
pretrial detention imperils defendants’ exercise of their 
constitutional rights. 
 
III. The 1984 Act in Practice—Defense Attorneys’ 
Perspectives 
 
The 1984 Act’s authorization of preventive pretrial 
detention has had a profound impact on the ability of defense 
attorneys to defend their clients and on the defendants’ 
abilities to exercise their constitutional rights. 
 
 
 
123. Id. at 748. 
124. Id. at 751. 
125. Id. at 752-55. 
126. 342 U.S. 1 (1951). 
127. 342 U.S. 524 (1952). 
128. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 754-55. 
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A. The Detention Hearing 
 
Under the 1984 Act, after a defendant is arrested, a 
detention hearing is held at which the court attempts to 
determine the “risk of flight” or “danger to the community” 
posed by the defendant. After the detention hearing, a 
defendant is either released on bail or remanded for the 
pretrial period.129 The detention hearing is held at the 
defendant’s first appearance before the court130—usually in 
front of a magistrate judge—unless either party seeks a 
continuance. 
The 1984 Act favors pretrial release.131 Nonetheless, the 
issue of detention has become closely litigated, especially in 
cases where a defendant has a prior criminal record or 
substantial ties to a foreign country. In addition, because of the 
increasing number of narcotics cases, a growing number of 
defendants fall within the rebuttable presumption of the 1984 
Act,132 so that even first time offenders often struggle to gain 
pretrial release. 
The detention hearing can provide an insight into the 
government’s case and present a strategic opportunity as well. 
Andrew Weinstein133 explains: 
 
129. See, e.g., Krista Ward & Todd R. Wright, Pretrial Detention Based 
Solely on Community Danger: A Practical Dilemma, 1999 FED. CTS. L. REV. 2, 
I.2 (1999) (calling into question whether a detention hearing based on danger 
to the community alone is authorized by the 1984 Act). 
130. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)-(f) (2006). 
131. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a); see United States v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d 63, 75 
(2d Cir. 2007) (finding that even if the government establishes, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant presents a flight risk, the 
government must also demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
no conditions could be imposed on the defendant that would reasonably 
assure his attendance in court. The operative standard is “reasonable 
assurances” not conditions that guarantee attendance); see also United States 
v. Tomero, 169 F. App'x 639, 641 (2d Cir. 2006). 
132. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1). 
133. Mr. Weinstein received a B.A. from the University of Michigan in 
1987 and graduated, magna cum laude, from Cardozo School of Law in 1990. 
Following his graduation from Cardozo, Mr. Weinstein served as a law clerk 
to the Hon. Charles H. Tenney, United States District Judge for the Southern 
District of New York. Between 1991 and 1998, Mr. Weinstein was associated 
with LaRossa, Mitchell, and Ross, a boutique criminal defense firm in New 
York City where he participated in many high-profile criminal trials. Mr. 
Weinstein is the founder of The Weinstein Law Firm PLLC in New York City 
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In one case I was involved in, the prosecution 
sought an order of detention based upon an 
extensive proffer that relied, in part, upon 
evidence obtained derivatively from certain Title 
III intercepted communications. The defense 
maintained, successfully, that in light of the 
information contained within the government’s 
proffer, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9) required that the 
government turn over to the defense the court 
orders and accompanying applications for the 
underlying T III intercepted communications. 
The government had apparently not considered 
the disclosure provisions of § 2518(9) and there 
were tactical reasons why the government did 
not want to disclose these documents to the 
defense. Ultimately, the government had to turn 
over the orders and affidavits and they proved to 
contain significant helpful information, including 
the identification of potential witnesses, that was 
critically important and valuable in connection 
with the preparation of the defense. Absent, the 
vigorous litigation which took place at the 
detention hearing stage, these orders and 
applications likely would have never been 
obtained by the defense, particularly given the 
government’s position that they did not intend to 
introduce any of the resulting recordings at 
trial.134 
 
1. Risk of Flight and the Law of Return 
 
Historically, the risk of flight revolved around the 
likelihood that a defendant would not appear as required at 
subsequent court proceedings, including trial. As set forth in 
Section I, above, early bail laws sought to enlist suretors or 
 
where he continues to represent individual and corporate clients in a wide 
array of criminal investigations and in all stages of complex criminal and 
civil litigation in federal and New York state courts. 
134. Letter from Andrew Weinstein to authors (Jan. 31, 2012) (on file 
with authors). 
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require monetary bonds to guarantee a defendant’s 
appearance.135 Following the Vera Institute of Justice’s 
Manhattan Bail Project, the defendant’s community ties 
became increasingly important to the bail determination. 
Today, defense attorneys attempt to assess the nature and 
quality of a defendant’s ties to the community, including the 
number of family members in the local area, a defendant’s 
work situation, and, conversely, any ties that the defendant or 
his family have to any other state or foreign jurisdiction, in 
order to demonstrate to the court that a defendant can be 
relied upon to appear as required. Martin Geduldig136 notes 
that, “The most common reason for a defendant to be denied 
bail is the crime charged—homicide, drugs. Another very 
common reason is the country of origin of a defendant—
whether he is a citizen or not. A naturalized citizen with 
contacts abroad is viewed with skepticism.”137 
Recently, the government has advanced the proposition 
that individual defendants with ties to Israel present an 
additional risk of flight given Israel’s Law of Return,138 which 
provides that every Jew has the right to come to Israel and to 
claim Israeli citizenship. Although Israel allows extradition to 
the United States,139 the argument is nonetheless often made 
that a defendant who is Jewish presents a prima facie risk of 
flight. As has been argued, if this means that anyone to whom 
the Law of Return applies is an increased flight risk, then 
“every Jew” would have to be viewed for bail purposes as a 
greater risk of flight than a non-Jew. “That means at least 
 
135. See United States v. Friedman, 837 F.2d 48, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(finding that simply being charged with a crime, conviction of which carries a 
potential sentence of incarceration, does not create a presumption of a risk of 
flight for the purposes of the 1984 Act). 
136. Mr. Geduldig is a Georgetown University Law Center graduate and 
a former counsel to the New York State Senate Committee on Crime and 
Correction. He is currently the Chairman of the Nassau County Bar 
Association Committee on Criminal Procedure and Committee on Federal 
Courts and is listed as one of the top ten criminal defense lawyers in Long 
Island, New York. 
137. Letter from Martin Geduldig to authors (Feb. 15, 2012) (on file with 
authors). 
138. The Law of Return, 5710-1950, SH No. 51 p. 189 (Isr.), available at 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/return.htm. 
139. United States v. Samet, 11 F. App'x 21, 22 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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5,300,000 Americans would be viewed as heightened bail risks 
simply because they are Jew[ish].”140 “[This] logic would [ ] 
extend even to a Jew[ish] American whose family lived in this 
country since the first Jews arrived on the shores of New 
Amsterdam in 1654.”141 From a defense perspective, this 
reading of the 1984 Act’s “risk of flight” provision is clearly 
nonsensical. 
Moreover, Israel and the United States have signed 
extradition treaties142 providing that each country must 
extradite its own nationals at the request of the other.143 In 
2005, the Justice Department advised the Senate that from 
1999 to 2005, “the United States has extradited a total of 20 
fugitives from Israel, of whom 15 were Israeli nationals 
(including dual United States-Israeli nationals).”144 
 
For example, in 2002, Michael Akva, an Israeli 
citizen, was extradited by Israel to the United 
States on securities fraud and insider trading 
charges. In 2000, Sharon Haroush, an Israeli 
citizen, was extradited by Israel to the United 
 
140. Memorandum of Law in Support of Sholom Rubashkin's Motion for 
Reconsideration of His Pre-trial Detention at 6 United States v. Rubashkin, 
718 F. Supp. 2d 953 (N.D. Iowa 2010) (No. 08-1324), 2008 WL 6458257 
[hereinafter Rubashkin’s Motion]; see Mordecai Plaut, The Real State of 
American Jewry, HAARETZ (Nov. 12, 2003), http://www.haaretz.com/news/the-
real-state-of-american-jewry-1.105442. 
141. Rubashkin’s Motion, supra note 140, at 13. 
142. Convention on Extradition Between the Government of the State of 
Israel and the Government of the United States of America, U.S.-Isr., Dec. 
10, 1962, 14 U.S.T. 1707. 
143. Id. at art. IV (“[a] requested Party shall not decline to extradite a 
person sought because such person is a national of the requested Party.”). 
144. Pending Treaties: Congressional Testimony Before Committee on 
Senate Foreign Relations, at 7 (Nov. 15, 2005) (statement of Mary E. Warlow, 
Director, Office of Int’l Affairs, Criminal Div., Dep’t of Justice, S. Comm. on 
Foreign Relations) [hereinafter Warlow Statement]; see Rubashkin’s Motion, 
supra note 140, at 17 n.20 (“A limited exception [now] applies to persons who 
were Israelis at the time of the offense. Such persons are still to be extradited 
from Israel to the United States, but only on the condition that they be 
returned to Israel to serve their sentences”). This condition of returning 
Isrealis to Israel to serve their sentence was part of the pre-existing 
procedure that the Justice Department found to be workable. Warlow 
Statement, supra note 144; see also Extradition Law, 5714-1954, 8 LSI 144 
(1953-1954)(Isr.). 
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States on fraud and theft charges.145 [In 1977], 
Chaim Berger, an American citizen from New 
York . . . was indicted in the Southern District of 
New York for defrauding the government of 
many millions of dollars. He fled to Israel where 
he had never lived previously, and claimed 
citizenship under the Law of Return. He was 
extradited back to the United States, pled guilty 
and was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment.146 
In 2006, the Attorney General of the United 
States publicly praised Israel for its extradition 
to the United States of an Israeli who was a 
suspected [organized crime] boss on drug charges 
. . . . [D]espite the history of successful 
extraditions, the Administration sought and 
obtained Senate ratification for a protocol 
amending the treaty to “significantly 
streamline[] the process of requesting 
extradition.” [T]he amended treaty now allows 
the use of hearsay; streamline[s] the procedures 
for ‘provisional arrest;’ expands the list of 
extraditable offenses, providing that any crime 
that constitutes an offense in both countries and 
is punishable by imprisonment of one year or 
more is extraditable; [and] requires that only one 
offense need be extraditable—as long as there is 
one extraditable offense in the United States’ 
extradition request, Israel can extradite on non-
extraditable offenses as well.147 
 
145. Rubashkin’s Motion, supra note 140, at 15 (citing SEC Obtains 
Default Judgments Ordering Two Defendants to Pay $7.6 Million For Insider 
Trading, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n Litigation Release No. 18193 (June 18, 
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18193.htm). 
146. Id. at 15 n.14 (citing Randal C. Archibald, Israeli Court Allows 
Return of Man Indicted in Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2001, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/07/nyregion/israeli-court-allows-return-of-
man-indicted-in-fraud.html; United States v. Berger, 22 F. Supp. 2d 145 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002)); see United States v. Berger, No. 97-Cr-00410-BSJ (S.D.N.Y. 
May 23, 2002) (No. 167, Filed Judgment as to Defendant Chaim Berger). 
147. Id. at 15-16 (citing U.S. Attorney General Praises Israel for Fight 
Against Terror, International Crime, HAARETZ, June 27, 2006, 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/u-s-attorney-general-praises-israel-for-fight-
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Not surprisingly, after the new Protocol was 
signed, extraditions from Israel increased . . . . 
For example, in September 2010 the United 
States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District 
of New York announced that Israel had arrested 
nine Israelis in a lottery telemarketing fraud 
scheme. According to the government’s press 
release, “[t]his case involves the largest number 
of Israeli citizens ever to be provisionally 
arrested by Israel in anticipation of 
extradition.”148 
 
Due to “the effectiveness of the treaty, the Law of Return 
does not create an opportunity for successful flight from 
prosecution.”149 And it therefore creates no motive to flee. 
Should a defendant flee nonetheless, “to accelerate the 
extradition procedure, some courts have required as a condition 
of bail that defendants with strong ties to Israel (including 
citizenship) execute irrevocable waivers of extradition.”150 
In the Authors’ experience, defendants with ties to foreign 
countries including Israel may be granted bail if they are able 
to post a high bond. For example, in United States v. 
Shereshevsky,151 Judge Lynch granted bail to a convicted felon 
charged in an alleged two hundred and fifty million dollar 
securities fraud action where the defendant had substantial 
 
against-terror-1.191465; Warlow Statement, supra note 144, at 6-7; Israel 
Extradition Treaty, U.S.-Isr., Dec. 10, 1962, art. II, IX, XI, 14 U.S.T. 1707). 
148. Id. at 17 (citing Press Release, U.S. Attorney S. Dist. of N.Y., Isr.-
Based Defendants Indicted and Arrested in Lottery Telemarketing Fraud 
Targeting U.S. Citizens (Sept. 26, 2008), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/September08/mayoetalarrestindi
ctmentpr.pdf). 
149. Id. at 18. 
150. Id. (citing United States v. Shimon, No. 06-Cr-0210, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 52979 (D. Nev. July 27, 2006) (Israeli citizen released upon condition 
of executing extradition waiver); United States v. Karni, 298 F. Supp. 2d 129, 
133 (D.D.C. 2004) (same); United States v. Cohen, No. 00-Cr-00100 (S.D. Fla. 
May 5, 2000); Order Requiring Written Waiver of Extradition, United States 
v. Cohen, No. 00-Cr-00100 (S.D. Fla. May 5, 2000), ECF No. 35; Order 
Denying Request for Pretrial Detention, United States v. Cohen, No. 02-MJ-
02592 (S.D. Fla. May 3, 2002), ECF No. 16; Detention Hearing, United States 
v. Freund, No. 99-Cr-00561 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 1999), ECF. No. 22). 
151. No. 94-Cr-248 (CSH), 2003 WL 21497629 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2003). 
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international ties and business operations in Israel and Africa. 
Some of the countries in Africa had no extradition treaties with 
the United States. Letters written by rabbis and members of 
the Orthodox Jewish community and incorporated into 
counsel’s memorandum in favor of bail evidenced his 
“substantial . . . family and community ties,”152 and Mr. 
Shereshevsky was granted bail. Mr. Shereshevsky’s bail was 
set at a ten million dollar personal recognizance bond cosigned 
by ten financially responsible people, at least five of whom were 
not related to him through blood or marriage, one million 
dollars in property not owned by Mr. Shereshevsky, secured by 
five thousand dollars cash from each cosigner, and home 
confinement with electronic monitoring.153 
In United States v. Ezagui,154 Magistrate Judge Go granted 
bail even though Mr. Ezagui had been arrested at John F. 
Kennedy Airport with a one-way ticket to South America, and 
was a citizen of Israel where his wife and children resided. His 
bail consisted of a three million dollar bond cosigned by his 
brother and one additionally financially responsible surety, 
secured by three properties owned by his brother and his 
brother’s shares in a corporation, and home detention with 
electronic monitoring.155 While on bail, Mr. Ezagui’s son was 
injured during service with the Israeli army, and the court 
granted him permission to visit his son in Israel. He spent 
approximately two weeks there and returned without incident, 
adhering to the court’s restrictions. 
 
152. Memorandum in Support of Pretrial Release, United States v. 
Shereshevsky, No. 94-Cr-248 (CSH), 2003 WL 21497629 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 
2003) (available through ECF, original on file with the authors). 
153. Mr. Shereshevsky later was unable to meet the conditions, and 
argued that the bail should be reduced. Shereshevsky relied on United States 
v. Penaranda, No. 00-Cr-1251(RWS), 2001 WL 125621, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 
13, 2001) (“[W]here a defendant cannot meet the financial conditions of his 
bail, then the court should consider where that particular financial condition 
is a necessary part of the bail conditions to provide reasonable assurance of 
the defendant’s appearance, and set forth written findings of fact and legal 
conclusions regarding that issue”). 
154. 08-MJ-00530 (E.D.N.Y. July 28, 2008). 
155. John Marzulli & William Sherman, Brooklyn Developer Eliyahu 
Ezagui Indicted in $18M Mortgage Fraud, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 2, 2009, 
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2009-04-02/local/17920261_1_mortgage-
fraud-indictment-buyers. 
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2. Danger to the Community 
 
Since the enactment of the 1984 Act, a defendant’s 
perceived danger to the community has become a frequently 
contested basis for pretrial detention. Although not defined in 
the 1984 Act, “danger” is understood to mean “the likelihood 
that the accused will engage in criminal activity, including 
non-violent criminal activity, if released.”156 As Andrew 
Weinstein notes: 
 
Putting aside those crimes with presumptions in 
favor of detention, the seriousness of the crime a 
defendant is charged with, whether it is a crime 
of violence, how much prison time the defendant 
is facing upon conviction, whether the defendant 
is alleged to be part of a criminal organization 
(such as in a RICO or CCE prosecution), and if 
so, what his or her position is within such 
organization, are all factors that typically play 
into a court’s decision whether to release a 
defendant on bail. 
 
* * * * 
 
Typically, the defendant’s prior history plays a 
significant role in advancing arguments in favor 
of bail pending trial. Regardless of the 
prosecution’s arguments in favor of detention 
and/or the nature of the crime charged, the 
defendant’s prior history is usually a good source 
of information to refute such arguments. For 
example, if the defendant has no prior criminal 
history, one could argue that as a factor weighing 
heavily in favor of release on bail. Conversely, if 
the defendant has an extensive and long-
 
156. Michael Harwin, Note, Detaining for Danger Under the Bail Reform 
Act of 1984: Paradoxes of Procedure and Proof, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 1091, 1091 
(1993). 
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standing criminal history, that too could be a 
factor that one can argue should weigh heavily in 
favor of release. For example, if the defendant’s 
history is replete with prior arrests and 
convictions, but no criminal activity while the 
defendant was out on bail in any other case and 
no prior instance of bail jumping, one could take 
the long criminal history of his or her client and 
turn it into a positive by arguing that the Court 
need not speculate as to whether the defendant 
would commit crimes and/or come back to court if 
released on bail (like the Court would with 
someone without any criminal history) since, 
despite the defendant’s long and extensive 
criminal history, he/she has never once been 
charged with committing a crime while on 
release or with failing to come to court when 
required.157 
 
Martin Geduldig agrees that: 
 
A defendant’s prior arrest for a serious crime can 
be a major obstacle in getting reasonable bail. 
Prior arrests for relatively minor crimes do not 
present a great obstacle. An extended period 
without any arrests and a fairly consistent work 
record during that time is extremely helpful. I 
had a case involving a [thirty-eight]-year-old 
defendant who had been convicted as a [sixteen] 
year old of attempted murder. He served a [ten] 
year sentence. During the [fifteen] years he was 
released, he had one drug arrest but the new 
judge could not get [past] the [twenty] year old 
attempted murder conviction and set a very high 
bail.158 
 
As already noted, certain charges carry with them a 
 
157. Letter from Andrew Weinstein to authors, supra note 134. 
158. Letter from Martin Geduldig to authors, supra note 137. 
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rebuttable presumption of dangerousness—crimes of violence, 
the use or possession of a firearm in connection with a crime of 
violence, a capital offense, or a drug offense where a sentence of 
ten years or more is mandated under Title 21 of the United 
States Code.159 In addition, defendants charged with a crime of 
violence, a capital offense, or a narcotics felony with a 
minimum ten-year penalty who were “previously convicted of 
or released from prison for a similar offense not more than five 
years before the judicial finding”160 are presumed dangerous. 
In presumption cases, the presumption shifts the burden of 
production to the defendant, but the government retains the 
burden of persuasion.161 Nevertheless, even if the defendant 
“successfully rebuts the presumption, the fact that it was 
triggered may still be considered in release or detention 
determinations.”162 
Since the enactment of the 1984 Act, there has been a 
dramatic increase in the number of defendants denied pretrial 
release, especially in narcotics cases.163 In its report, the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary explained that “dangerousness” 
was to be construed broadly, and emphasized that “the risk 
that a defendant will continue to engage in drug trafficking 
constitutes a danger to the ‘safety of any other person or the 
community.’”164 Further, “[p]ersons charged with major drug 
felonies are often in the business of importing or distributing 
dangerous drugs, and thus because of the nature of the 
criminal activity with which they are charged, they pose a 
 
159. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1) (2006); see also Christopher A. Andreoff, 
A Primer on Federal Criminal Procedure, 72 MICH. B.J. 60, 61 (1993). 
160. Harwin, supra note 156, at 1110. 
161. Andreoff, supra note 159, at 61. 
162. Id.; see Harwin, supra note 156 at 1111-17 (describing cases where 
the presumption, even though rebutted, provided the court with a basis for 
detention). 
163. Harwin, supra note 156, at 1122 n.32 (citing U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-88-6, CRIMINAL BAIL: HOW BAIL REFORM IS 
WORKING IN SELECTED DISTRICT COURTS 17, 20 (1987); U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-90-7, IMPACT OF BAIL REFORM IN 
SELECTED DISTRICT COURTS 17-18 (1989); Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Forward 
to Symposium, Crime Control Act of 1984, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV., at vi, viii n.4 
(1985); see Thomas E. Scott, Pretrial Detention under the Bail Reform Act of 
1984: An Empirical Analysis, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 22 (1989)). 
164. S. REP. NO. 98-225 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 
3196, 1983 WL 25404, at *12-13. 
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significant risk of pretrial recidivism.”165 
Despite Congress’s intention that the drug presumption 
should apply to “major” drug traffickers,166 the presumption’s 
reliance on the prospective sentence faced by a defendant 
combined with the fact that many low-level drug defendants 
are charged as part of conspiracies in which the total quantity 
of drugs is large, leads to the pretrial detention of numerous 
non-dangerous defendants. Occasionally, these pretrial 
detention orders are successfully challenged,167 but in the 
authors’ experience, in many cases defendants choose not to 
appeal a detention order, assuming that they will be convicted 
and relying on the fact that the time they spend in custody will 
ultimately be credited toward their sentence. 
Courts have also begun to consider that “danger” may 
include the possibility of economic harm. Thus, in United 
States v. Dekhkanov,168 Judge Bianco denied pretrial release to 
Mr. Dekhkanov, a twenty-five-year-old first-time offender who 
was charged with conspiracy to commit mail fraud, access 
device fraud, and aggravated identity theft with a loss total of 
five hundred thousand dollars, despite his offer to post a four 
million dollar bond secured by numerous properties and 
suretors. The court found that the possibility that, if released, 
Mr. Dekhkanov could continue the charged scheme, which 
allegedly involved accessing information from credit cards, 
posed a danger to the community. 
Similarly, in high profile cases such as United States v. 
Madoff,169 Judge Kaplan granted release on extremely 
stringent conditions, including Mr. Madoff’s hiring a security 
company to provide twenty-four-hour surveillance of his 
residence. The Judge concluded that, although economic harm 
might be a proper consideration with respect to detention, 
 
165. Id. at 20. 
166. Id. 
167. See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 635 F. Supp. 1047 (D. Kan. 1986) 
(The denial of pretrial release was overturned where no evidence established 
that no set of conditions would reasonably assure the safety of the 
community. The district court’s opinion noted that an indictment that 
triggers the presumption is insufficient to establish by clear and convincing 
evidence that the defendant is a danger to the community). 
168. 2:11-Cr-00581 (JFB) (E.D.N.Y. 2011). 
169. 586 F. Supp. 2d 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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there was no substantial risk that Mr. Madoff would continue 
to pose an economic danger to the community given the change 
in his circumstances. 
Bobbi Sternheim170 offers an example of a case in which 
bail was denied in a presumption case, yet the defendant was 
ultimately sentenced to time served: 
 
I represented a man who was arrested because 
his coat was hung in a closet above which a 
locked box contained a firearm. He was charged 
with a narcotics conspiracy involving a [ten]-year 
mandatory minimum sentence and a 924(c) 
weapons offense mandating a consecutive [five]-
year sentence. My client, in need of a place to 
stay after having had a fight with his roommate, 
paid the lessee of the apartment a weekly fee to 
sleep in the apartment. My client had no keys to 
the apartment. The lessee, a target of the 
investigation, was the subject of a search 
warrant. My client was sitting outside the 
building smoking a cigarette when agents came 
to execute the warrant. My client—who was not 
involved in any discovery, which included 
electronic and visual surveillance—answered 
questions by the agents concerning the 
apartment and informed the agents that he was 
staying in the apartment but had not been given 
keys by the lessee. He was arrested after 
 
170. Bobbi C. Sternheim, Esq. litigates a broad range of complex 
criminal matters in federal courts. She is a Fellow of the American College of 
Trial Lawyers and a member of the College’s Committee on Teaching Trial 
and Appellate Advocacy. She teaches trial advocacy at Pace Law School and 
the Federal CJA Trial Skills Academy at California Western School of Law. 
She is the Acting Director of the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law’s 
Intensive Trial Advocacy Program and a supervisor in Cardozo’s Criminal 
Appeals Clinic. She is the Criminal Justice Act representative for the 
Southern District of New York, a member of the district’s CJA Peer Review 
Committee, Best Practices Committee, and Mentor Program. She also serves 
on the Joint Committee for Local Rules for the Southern and Eastern 
Districts of New York. She is a facilitator and presenter at continuing legal 
education seminars and has provided legal commentary for print and 
television media. 
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issuance of the warrant when he identified his 
coat after agents recovered a gun in the locked 
box on a shelf above the coat. The indictment 
charged more than [ten] defendants; all but my 
client were Hispanic. My client was a white Jew. 
 
Bail was denied due to the nature of the charges, 
the presumptions in the Bail Reform Act relating 
to mandatory minimum sentencing and because 
my client has a prior felony having pled guilty to 
possession of a bad check in Florida, making him 
a “felon in possession” of a firearm. The 
government opposed bail during my bail 
application before the magistrate judge and 
when I renewed my application before the 
district court judge. 
 
My client maintained his innocence throughout. 
The AUSA rejected his innocence proffer as well 
as my submission in support of a deferred 
prosecution. As trial approached, I renewed [m]y 
request for a deferred prosecution. Ultimately, 
the AUSA offered a plea to a misprision of felony. 
My client accepted the plea, lest he risk a 
conviction at trial and a mandatory sentence of 
[fifteen] years. The length of his pretrial 
detention exceeded the guideline sentence for the 
misprision charge and the client received a 
sentence of time served. 
 
After sentencing, the district judge asked, “How 
did I miss this one?” To which I replied that had 
the court heeded the argument of seasoned and 
reputable defense counsel this never would have 
happened.171 
 
Where the rebuttable presumption does not operate, 
 
171. Letter from Bobbi Sternheim to authors (Feb. 15, 2012) (on file with 
authors). 
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defendants are significantly more likely to be granted pretrial 
release. Indeed, even arguably “dangerous” defendants facing 
charges including murder, attempted murder, murder 
conspiracy, gun possession, extortion, and kidnapping, have 
regularly received bail in the Southern and Eastern Districts of 
New York.172 In United States v. Sabhnani,173 for example, the 
Second Circuit vacated the district court’s order of pretrial 
detention, despite the violent nature of the charges-forced labor 
and harboring illegal aliens-holding that, “it is only a limited 
 
172. See, e.g., United States v. Modica, 09-Cr-1243 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (Mr. Modica, an alleged soldier in the Gambino Crime Family, was 
charged with, inter alia, racketeering conspiracy, racketeering, illegal 
gambling, extortion, and assault in aid of racketeering. Mr. Modica was 
alleged to have committed five of the eighteen racketeering acts alleged in 
the multi-defendant indictment including murder, jury tampering, and 
obstruction of justice, yet he was released on bail. Michael Scotto, one of Mr. 
Modica's co-defendants, was granted bail with a three million dollar bond. 
Mr. Scotto was charged with, inter alia, racketeering conspiracy, 
racketeering, extortion conspiracy, and sex trafficking of a minor); United 
States v. Persico, 376 F. App’x 155 (2d Cir. 2010) (Mr. Persico, an alleged 
associate in the Colombo crime family, the son of the official boss, and brother 
of the acting boss, was indicted him on charges of extortion and murder 
conspiracy, was released on a five million dollar bond); United States v. 
Gigante, 85 F.3d 83, 84 (2d Cir. 1996) (alleged “boss” of “Genovese organized 
crime family”); United States v. Spero, 99-Cr-520 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (alleged 
Consigliere of Bonanno Crime Family, charged with murder and other 
violence); United States v. Bellomo, 96-Cr-430 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (alleged 
Genovese Acting Underboss Mickey Generoso, charged with murder 
conspiracy); United States v. Fama, 95-Cr.-840 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (reputed 
soldier charged with heroin distribution, kidnapping and murder); United 
States v. Gregory Scarpa, Jr., 94-Cr-1119 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (accused 
participant in bloody Colombo Family war); United States v. Orena, 93-Cr-
1366 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (reputed soldier and boss’ son, charged with murder 
conspiracy and weapons possession); United States v. Failla, 93-Cr-294 
(E.D.N.Y. 1993) (multiple high-ranking members of Gambino Family accused, 
among other charges, of killing a government witness); United States v. 
Conti, 93-Cr-053 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (organized crime defendant charged with 
murder and murder conspiracy); United States v. Russo, 92-Cr-529 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992) (alleged mafia captain charged with murder and other violent crimes); 
United States v. Persico, 92-Cr-351 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (alleged mafia captain 
charged with murder conspiracy in connection with internal Colombo war); 
United States v. Rosenfeld, 90-Cr-755 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (defendant released on 
bail despite charges of threatening one cooperator with a gun and killing 
another); cf., e.g., United States v. Fiumara, 02-Cr-317 (D.N.J. 2002) (reputed 
head of Genovese Family’s New Jersey faction, whose parole was revoked for 
four alleged murders). 
173. 493 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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group of offenders who should be denied bail pending trial.”174 
Similarly, in United States v. Khashoggi,175 the district 
court released Mr. Khashoggi, a wealthy Saudi Arabian 
businessman facing mail fraud charges, reasoning in part that 
the absence of a presumption “militat[ed] in favor of pretrial 
release.”176 And, in United States v. Patriarca,177 the district 
court released the alleged former head of the Patriarca crime 
family on conditions of house arrest with electronic monitoring, 
reasoning that conditions existed to assure the court of his 
appearance and of the safety of the community. 
In United States v. Rubashkin,178 Mr. Rubashkin was 
charged in a 163-count Indictment alleging a massive bank 
fraud, money laundering, mail fraud, wire fraud, harboring 
undocumented aliens, false statements, and violations of the 
Packers and Stockyards Act. Despite the breadth and the 
magnitude of the charges, Mr. Rubashkin was granted bail on a 
ten million dollar bond. 
 
3. Moral Suasion 
 
In deciding what level of bond to set, courts often look to 
the persons who offer themselves as suretors for the defendant, 
seeking to establish that the proposed bond will have sufficient 
moral suasion over the defendant that he will not violate the 
terms of his release. Where family members offer to post their 
property as collateral or to co-sign a bond, a bail argument 
gains persuasive force because the defense attorney is able to 
demonstrate that individuals close to the defendant believe 
that the defendant will not flee or endanger the community. 
 
In United States v. Dina Wein-Reis,179 the defendant was 
charged in the Southern District of Indiana with one count of 
 
174. Id. 75 (quoting United States v. Shakur, 817 F.2d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 
1987)(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
175. 717 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
176. Id. at 1051. 
177. 776 F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1991). 
178. 718 F. Supp. 2d 953 (N.D. Iowa 2010). 
179. United States v. Wein-Reis, No. 08-MJ-02362 (UA) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 
28, 2008). 
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conspiracy to commit wire fraud and six counts of wire fraud. 
She was arrested at her home in New York. Ms. Wein-Reis was 
denied bail at a hearing in front of the presiding magistrate 
judge in the Southern District of New York and was scheduled 
to be extradited to Indiana on Wednesday, November 5, 2008. 
Ms. Wein-Reis’s attorney, John Meringolo, immediately 
appealed the bail denial and Judge Shira Scheindlin, the 
presiding Part I Judge, specially opened the federal courthouse 
in the Southern District of New York on Tuesday, November 4, 
2008—Election Day—in order to hear counsel’s bail arguments, 
demonstrating the fundamental importance of ensuring that a 
defendant’s application for bail be heard expeditiously.180 
At the bail hearing, the government argued that Ms. Wein-
Reis should be detained because she was a risk of flight with 
property in Israel and the means to flee. Ms. Reis had a home 
in Israel, conducted business there, and even visited 
frequently. After an extensive argument and presentation of a 
substantial bail package, Judge Scheindlin granted bail on a 
ten million dollar bond secured by approximately 2.5 million 
dollars in property. The bail package was strengthened by Ms. 
Wein-Reis’s brother’s, Hershel Wein, offer to post his home and 
his annual salary—1.3 million dollars—as collateral. As 
reported by the Daily News, Judge Scheindlin confirmed with 
Mr. Wein that he had “[o]ne hundred percent”181 confidence 
that Ms. Wein-Reis would not violate the terms of her release. 
In retrospect, Judge Scheindlin’s decision was correct. Ms 
Wein-Reis did not flee and complied with all bail conditions 
imposed. 
 
 
 
 
4. Appellate Review of Bail Denials 
 
“To eliminate unnecessary detention, the court must 
 
180. See Thomas Zambito, Yes, Judge, My Sister is Worth $10M, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS, Nov. 5, 2008, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/yes-
judge-sister-worth-10m-article-1.336351. 
181. Id. 
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supervise the detention within the district of any defendants 
awaiting trial . . . .”182 “The judicial officer may at any time 
amend the order to impose additional or different conditions of 
release.”183 In addition, a defendant who is denied bail by a 
magistrate judge may appeal that denial to the district 
judge.184 The district court may “independently review the 
magistrate’s order and conduct any necessary evidentiary 
hearings or receive additional affidavits.”185 
As with other matters, a defendant who is denied bail by 
the district court may appeal to the circuit. The 1984 Act does 
not provide a standard for appellate review of bail 
determinations.186 However, the Second Circuit reviews a 
denial of bail for clear error, that is, the denial will be upheld 
“unless ‘on the entire evidence we are left with the definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’”187 
In United States v. Trucchio,188 the Second Circuit 
overturned the district court and granted bail to Mr. Trucchio, 
an alleged captain in the Gambino crime family who was 
charged with racketeering, distribution of marijuana, cocaine, 
marijuana, and ecstasy trafficking, assault in aid of 
racketeering, illegal gambling, and loansharking. Mr. Trucchio 
proposed a three million dollar bail package secured by real 
property—homes in which he and members of his extended 
family lived, and which counsel argued provided significant 
moral suasion.189 The government opposed bail, arguing that 
the drug trafficking charges and the resulting presumption as 
well as the significant sentencing exposure made Mr. Trucchio 
 
182. FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(h)(1). 
183. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(3) (2006). 
184. 18 U.S.C. § 3145 (2006). 
185. Michael Edmund O’Neill, Note, A Two-Pronged Standard of 
Appellate Review for Pretrial Bail Determinations, 99 YALE L.J. 885, 891 
(1990). 
186. See id. at 895. 
187. United States v. Persico, 376 F. App’x 155, 157 (2010) (quoting 
United States v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 2007)) (citation omitted). 
188. United States v. Trucchio, No. 11-Cr-12 (RMB) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 
2011). The district court revoked Trucchio’s bail following his plea of guilty. 
189. Alphonse Trucchio’s Motion and Supporting Memorandum for 
Release on Bail Pending Trial at 17-18, United States v. Trucchio, No. 11-Cr-
12 (RMB) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2011), ECF No. 147. 
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a risk of flight and a danger to the community.190 
Judge Berman denied Trucchio’s motion for bail, and an 
expedited appeal was taken.191 Three months later, the Second 
Circuit reversed the district’s denial, and granted bail.192 Mr. 
Trucchio was released on a slightly modified version of the 
three million dollar bond that he originally proposed. 
 
B. The Effect of a Denial of Bail 
 
Despite the procedural protections in the 1984 Act, many 
defense attorneys, including the Authors and others 
interviewed for this Article, find that the preventive pretrial 
detention provisions and the broad judicial discretion to detain 
a defendant based on the perceived “risk of flight” or “danger to 
the community” have a significant and detrimental impact on 
every stage of the case.193 
 
190. Government’s Motion for Detention-Defendant Alphonse Trucchio 
at 12, United States v. Trucchio, No. 11-Cr-12 (RMB) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 
2011), ECF No. 154. 
191. Docket Minute Entry, United States v. Trucchio, No. 11-Cr-12 
(RMB) (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2011); Order, United States v. Trucchio, No. 11-Cr-
12 (RMB) (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2011), ECF No. 191; Notice of Appeal, United 
States v. Trucchio, No. 11-Cr-12 (RMB) (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2011), ECF No. 
192. 
192. Docket Minute Entry, United States v. Trucchio, No. 11-Cr-12 
(RMB) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2011); Agreement to Forfeit Property (other than 
real property) to Obtain a Defendant’s Release, United States v. Trucchio, 
No. 11-Cr-12 (RMB) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2011), ECF No. 244. 
193. See Joseph L. Lester, Presumed Innocent, Feared Dangerous: The 
Eighth Amendment’s Right to Bail, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (2005): 
 
The difference between being released prior to trial and 
being incarcerated often is the difference between an 
acquittal and a conviction. No matter how quickly a case is 
fast-tracked through the system, a detained defendant will 
suffer some material harm. The defendant will be displaced 
from work and familial duties, as well as suffer the stigma 
of being a prisoner. But most important, a freed defendant 
is able to better defend himself against the government. A 
freed defendant can better assist his attorney in gathering 
evidence and securing witnesses so that the government’s 
burden to convict remains high. Pretrial detention severely 
limits a defendant’s ability to defend himself simply because 
his ability to contact the world is necessarily restricted. The 
setting of bail, although “often . . . done in haste [and at 
45
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1. Constitutional Concerns 
 
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
guarantees a defendant the right to assist in his own 
defense.194 However, when a defendant is denied bail, his 
ability to assist his attorney is severely limited. Despite all 
efforts to provide copies of pretrial discovery to detained 
clients, inefficient mail delivery, and a lack of adequate 
electronic equipment such as computers on which to listen to 
recordings, make it impossible for a client to fully examine all 
of the evidence produced by the government. In addition, an 
attorney going over the same discovery alone is at a 
disadvantage because the person best equipped to explain its 
significance to him—the client—is effectively inaccessible. 
Thus, the barriers between an attorney and his incarcerated 
client infringe on the client’s ability to exercise his 
constitutional right to assist in his own defense.195 
In addition, the presumption of innocence is endangered by 
pretrial incarceration of a defendant. Martin Geduldig explains 
that: 
 
The courts always try to keep a defendant’s bail 
status from the jury. For those defendants who 
fail to make bail and are incarcerated this effort 
is never successful. Those defendants released on 
bail will be seen in the halls of the court-house, 
or in local restaurants during the lunch break. A 
 
times] fixed without . . . full inquiry and much 
consideration,” is one of the most crucial steps in the 
administration of criminal justice. Bail should be fixed only 
after careful deliberation by a neutral party. Any shortcuts 
in this procedure are a direct assault on individual liberty 
and should always be guarded against. 
 
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
194. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
195. Courts have also considered the likely length of the period of 
pretrial detention in assessing whether pretrial release is warranted. See, 
e.g., United States v. Orena, 986 F.2d 628, 630-31 (2d Cir. 1993) (collecting 
cases); United States v. Frisone, 795 F.2d 1, 1 (2d Cir. 1986) (per curiam); 
United States v. Gallo, 653 F. Supp. 320, 336-39 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); United 
States v. Scarpa, 815 F. Supp. 88, 91 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). 
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jury’s perception of a defendant is altered by the 
fact of a defendant’s release.196 
 
2. Practical Considerations 
 
Andrew Weinstein explains how his ability to defend a 
client is changed when bail is denied: 
 
The ability to defend a client who is detained 
pending trial is significantly hampered, which is 
one of the many reasons that detention hearings 
are typically vigorously litigated. As noted above, 
access to a detained defendant is limited and 
generally speaking, detained defendants often 
suffer from diminished morale. For what would 
otherwise be a one hour meeting in the attorney’s 
office, counsel for a detained client will often 
need to block out the better part of an entire day 
for travel time to the prison, waiting to be 
processed and allowed in, waiting for the client to 
come down to the attorney visiting area, waiting 
for “counts” to clear, meeting with the client, and 
travel time back to the attorney’s office once the 
meeting has concluded. 
 
Having a detained client also makes listening to 
large quantities of tape recordings together 
impractical. Electronic equipment in the prisons 
is out of date, in limited supply, and there are 
significant restrictions that the BOP places on 
inmates using such equipment. Similar 
complications exist when dealing with large 
“paper” cases. Often times, cases have tens or 
hundreds of boxes of discovery and relevant 
documents that need to be reviewed. An 
organized system is easy to arrange for such 
review in an attorney’s office. The same cannot 
take place in a prison setting. 
 
196.  Letter from Martin Geduldig to authors, supra note 137. 
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Perhaps most important is the inability to confer 
with the client during overnight recesses when 
on trial. The reality is that preparation time 
during overnight breaks is a precious commodity. 
When a client is on bail, they can return to the 
attorney’s office and work into the evening with 
the attorney, review documents and evidence 
together with the attorney, discuss strategy for 
the following day, etc. When a client is detained, 
an attorney often has to make a difficult decision: 
Go visit the client in jail and forego many hours 
of valuable prep time in the office or spend the 
time in the office preparing for the following day 
and forego extensive and potentially valuable 
input from the client. The prejudice suffered by a 
detained client in terms of trial preparation is 
very difficult to quantify; yet anyone who has 
tried a case with a client who has been denied 
bail would attest to the simple proposition that a 
detained client is at a significant tactical 
disadvantage simply as a result of being 
detained.197 
 
Martin Geduldig agrees that: 
 
A defendant in jail is not available to readily 
reach out to prospective defense witnesses with 
whom he has a relationship. Telephone 
conversations with a jailed defendant are very 
circumscribed because of a legitimate fear that 
those conversations are being recorded. This 
leads to the need for more frequent jail visits, 
which result in substantial periods of wasted 
time traveling to and from jails and waiting for a 
client to be brought to the interview room.198 
 
 
197. Letter from Andrew Weinstein to authors, supra note 134. 
198. Letter from Martin Geduldig to authors, supra note 137. 
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James Harkins199 comments that: 
 
It is much more difficult to work with an 
incarcerated defendant because, as an 
investigator, you often need access to information 
that the client could easily provide if he were 
released, such as phone numbers or contact 
information for potential witnesses. Every step of 
the process is prolonged and complicated in an 
investigation for an incarcerated defendant.200 
 
In addition, an incarcerated defendant is substantially 
more likely to agree to a plea of guilty because the time spent 
in pretrial detention is credited toward the eventual sentence 
imposed. Therefore, rather than spending a year or more in 
pretrial detention and taking the case to trial, especially when 
the chance of winning a federal criminal case is less than two 
percent, an incarcerated defendant has every incentive to plead 
guilty and obtain a credit for the time served as well as the 
customary reduction under the Sentencing Guidelines for 
acceptance of responsibility.201 
 
 
 
 
3. United States v. Rea,202 A Personal Example 
 
 
199. James Harkins currently owns and operates a boutique private 
investigator service company in New York City. Mr. Harkins is a former 
decorated NYPD police officer. He won countless awards during his twenty 
years on the force, including Police Officer of the Month, United States 
Department of Justice Recognition Award, and Recognition Awards from the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Recognition Awards from the DEA and 
Exceptional and Meritorious Police Duty on sixty-one occasions. Since 
retiring from the Police Department, Mr. Harkins’ company has handled 
many high profile federal criminal cases around the United States. 
200. Telephone Interview with James Harkins, Private Investigator 
(Feb. 28, 2012). 
201. See also Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 4, at 420 (noting that a 
detained defendant’s ability to assist counsel is reduced). 
202. No. 10-Cr-767 (JBW) (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2010). 
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In 2010, Mr. Rea was arrested at his home in Henderson, 
Nevada, near Las Vegas, and charged in the Eastern District of 
New York with RICO conspiracy as a member of La Cosa 
Nostra, and racketeering acts including illegal gambling, the 
murder of Gerard Pappa (in July 1980), conspiracy to commit 
extortion of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 
807, and conspiracy to murder John Doe #1 in 1992.203 
Mr. Rea was extradited to New York, where counsel 
argued vigorously for bail, citing Mr. Rea’s extremely ill health 
and the fact that the murder charge was thirty years old.204 Mr. 
Rea suffered from diabetes and numerous complications 
including diabetic neuropathy for which he was taking 
prescription morphine, a drug that the Bureau of Prisons did 
not allow him to continue taking while incarcerated. As a 
result, Mr. Rea suffered from extreme pain during the few 
weeks of his pretrial incarceration. In addition he had recently 
undergone laparoscopic surgery and required a special diet. 
Moreover, he was a caregiver to his two minor non-biological 
grandchildren, whose mother was unable to provide for them. 
Considering all of these factors, as well as the significant bail 
package proposed—three million dollars secured by property—
Magistrate Joan Azrack agreed that Mr. Rea should be 
released on bond.205 
Thereafter, discovery provided by the government and 
counsel’s investigation demonstrated that the charges against 
Mr. Rea were unsubstantiated by the evidence. Just two 
months later, on January 3, 2011, the government advised 
counsel that it was dropping the murder charge.206 After 
 
203. See John Marzulli, Reputed Bonanno Crime Soldier Armando Rea 
Charged in 1980 Slay of Mafia Hitman, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 15, 2010, 
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2010-10-15/news/29440390_1_pappa-gravano-
genovese-mobster-gerard; Jerry Capeci, Bonanno Wiseguy Nabbed In 30-
Year-Old Mob Rubout, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 21, 2010, 11:30 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jerry-capeci/post_1126_b_773196.html. 
204. Defendant Armando Rea’s Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Omnibus Discovery Motion, United States v. Rea, No. 10-Cr-767 (JBW) 
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2010), ECF No. 5; Calendar: Magistrate’s Proceeding, 
United States v. Rea, No. 10-Cr-767 (JBW) (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2010), ECF No. 
9. 
205. Calendar: Magistrate’s Proceeding, supra note 204. 
206. Superseding Indictment, United States v. Rea, No. 10-Cr-767 
(JBW) (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2011), ECF No. 44. 
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significant pretrial arguments and after jury selection, the 
Honorable Jack B. Weinstein suppressed numerous tape 
recordings and agreed to reopen a hearing as to whether Mr. 
Rea’s pre- and post-arrest statements should be suppressed 
because he was denied his right to counsel when arrested in 
Nevada. On the morning of his scheduled trial, February 15, 
2011, Mr. Rea was offered and accepted a plea to a single count 
of conspiracy to commit extortion.207 On May 23, 2011, Judge 
Weinstein sentenced Mr. Rea, who had originally faced a 
sentence of life in prison, to five years of probation.208 
In the Authors’ opinion, the fact that Mr. Rea was released 
on bail and the resulting ability of counsel to meet with him 
often, to review the evidence, and to avail themselves of his 
assistance in gathering evidence to disprove the government’s 
original narrative, was essential to the outcome of the case. 209 
 
4. The Effect of Affluence—Recent High Profile Defendants 
on Bail 
 
Recently, the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York 
have released several high profile defendants on bail subject, in 
some cases, to provisions so extreme that they amounted to the 
creation of private detention facilities in the defendants’ homes. 
For instance, in the cases of Bernard Madoff210 and Marc 
Dreier,211 the court released the defendants to their own homes, 
but required them, in addition to other stringent release 
conditions, to hire twenty-four-hour security personnel to 
 
207. Waiver of Indictment, United States v. Rea, No. 10-Cr-767 (JBW) 
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2011), ECF No. 92; Superseding Information, United 
States v. Rea, No. 10-Cr-767 (JBW) (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2011), ECF No. 93; 
Criminal Cause for Pleading or Repleading, United States v. Rea, No. 10-Cr-
767 (JBW) (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2011), ECF No. 94. 
208. Criminal Cause for Sentencing, United States v. Rea, No. 10-Cr-767 
(JBW) (E.D.N.Y. May 23, 2011), ECF No. 100. 
209. Had Mr. Rea remained incarcerated during the pretrial period, it is 
likely that counsel would have spent numerous hours on auxiliary matters, 
such as letters to the Bureau of Prisons regarding Mr. Rea’s health. 
Consequently, continued pretrial incarceration would have had a negative 
impact on Mr. Rea’s ability to defend himself and adequately exercise his 
constitutional rights. 
210. United States v. Madoff, 586 F. Supp. 2d 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
211. United States v. Dreier, 596 F. Supp. 2d 831 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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monitor them. As Jonathan Zweig has noted, such detention 
orders, which are only available to very wealthy defendants, 
may be unconstitutional in their own right.212 In contrast, 
defendants of lesser means who face similar charges have a 
much more difficult bail argument to make, and are likely to be 
denied pretrial release.213 The unequal treatment afforded to 
some wealthy defendants calls into question the 
constitutionality of the courts’ decisions to release those 
individuals, despite those decisions’ compliance with the 1984 
Act’s mandate that a defendant be released on “personal 
recognizance,” or on the “least restrictive . . . condition, or 
combination of conditions, that [the] judicial officer determines 
will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as 
required and the safety of any other person and the 
community.”214 
 
a.     Bernard Madoff 
 
In Mr. Madoff’s case, the government and the defense 
agreed on an initial set of bail conditions that were made 
possible by Mr. Madoff’s wealth.215 These conditions included 
the following: a ten million dollar personal recognizance bond 
secured by properties and suretors; the filing of confessions of 
judgment with respect to four properties; twenty-four-hours-
per-day electronic monitoring at Mr. Madoff’s home, with 
release only for court appearances; the surrender of passports 
belonging to Mr. Madoff and his wife; and the condition that 
Mr. Madoff employ, “at his wife’s expense, a security firm 
acceptable to the Government, to provide” twenty-four-hour 
monitoring of Mr. Madoff’s apartment building and doors, with 
communication devices providing a direct link to the FBI and 
additional guards as requested to “prevent harm or flight.”216 
 
212. Jonathan Zweig, Note, Extraordinary Conditions of Release Under 
the Bail Reform Act, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 555, 574-76, 582 (2010). 
213. See, e.g., United States v. Dekhkanov, No. 11-Cr-581 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 
17, 2011). 
214. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a)-(c) (2006), held unconstitutional by United 
States v. Karper, No. 11-Cr-103 (TJM/RFT), 2011 WL 7451512 (N.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 10, 2011). 
215. Madoff, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 244. 
216. Id. at 244-45. 
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These conditions were later amended to include 
restrictions on the transfer of any property, and requirements 
that Mr. Madoff compile an inventory, to be checked once every 
two weeks, of all valuable portable items in his home.217 
In releasing Mr. Madoff to bail, the court wrote: 
 
The issue at this stage of the criminal 
proceedings is not whether Madoff has been 
charged in perhaps the largest Ponzi scheme 
ever, nor whether Madoff’s alleged actions should 
result in his widespread disapprobation by the 
public, nor even what is appropriate punishment 
after conviction. The legal issue before the Court 
is whether the Government has carried its 
burden of demonstrating that no condition or 
combination of conditions can be set that will 
reasonably assure Madoff’s appearance and 
protect the community from danger.218 
 
The court then found that the government had not met 
that burden, and that the conditions were sufficient to meet the 
requirements of the 1984 Act. 
 
b.     Marc Dreier 
 
In Mr. Dreier’s case, the court found that the government 
had proven that the defendant would pose a risk of flight if 
released without conditions.219 However, Judge Rakoff found 
that Dreier’s proposed bail package was sufficient to minimize 
the flight risk.220 The package included the following: a ten 
million dollar personal recognizance bond co-signed by the 
defendant’s son and mother; no computer access; surrender of 
travel documents; screening and searching of all visitors (who 
were to be pre-approved); strict Pretrial Services supervision; 
cooperation with a receiver to identify and preserve all assets; 
 
217. Id. at 243-44. 
218. Id. at 246 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2006)). 
219. United States v. Dreier, 596 F. Supp. 2d 831, 833 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
220. Id. 
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and “home detention, 24/7, in his East Side apartment, secured 
not only by electronic monitoring but by on-premises armed 
security guards, supplied by a company acceptable to the 
Government but paid for by the defendant’s relatives.”221 
The court found it to be “a serious flaw in our system” that 
wealthy defendants are able to obtain release because of their 
ability to pay for private monitoring; however, such flaws are 
“not a reason to deny a constitutional right to someone who, for 
whatever reason, can provide reasonable assurances against 
flight.”222 
 
c.     Robert Allen Stanford 
 
In contrast to Mr. Madoff and Mr. Dreier, Mr. Stanford 
was denied bail numerous times.223 Mr. Stanford was charged 
with twenty-one counts including, inter alia, wire fraud, mail 
fraud, conspiracy to commit securities fraud, money 
laundering, and obstructing an SEC investigation.224 The 
magistrate and district judges hearing Mr. Stanford’s case 
found that he presented a serious risk of flight and denied 
pretrial release. Mr. Stanford is a citizen of the United States 
and of Antigua and Barbuda who had lived primarily outside of 
the United States for the fifteen years prior to the filing of an 
SEC proceeding against him. He had numerous foreign bank 
accounts, and traveled extensively internationally.225 
 
221. Id. Nonetheless, the court imposed additional conditions on Mr. 
Drier, including the following requirements: “express[] consent in writing to 
the use, by the armed security guards, of ‘temporary preventive detention 
and the use of reasonable force’ to thwart any attempt to flee;” payment of 
three months’ worth of costs for the security guards into an escrow account; 
removal of all electronic communication devices, other than a single land-line 
telephone, and anything that “might serve as a weapon;” maintenance of a 
land-line phone; payment of electronic monitoring costs; and denial of all 
visitors who had not obtained “the express prior written permission of the 
Pre-Trial Services officer, given only after consultation with the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office.” Id. at 834. 
222. Id. at 833. 
223. United States v. Stanford, 367 F. App’x 507 (5th Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Stanford, 341 F. App’x 979 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Stanford, 630 F. Supp. 2d 751 (S.D. Tex. 2009). 
224. Stanford, 367 F. App’x at 507. 
225. Stanford, 630 F. Supp. 2d at 752-54. 
54http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/5
MERINGOLOMACRO 50 PAGES 11/13/2012 9:08 AM 
854 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:3 
Stanford challenged his detention on constitutional 
grounds, arguing that the detention was “excessively 
prolonged, and therefore punitive, in relation to Congress’s 
regulatory goal.”226 Given that a trial date had been set,227 that 
Mr. Sanford had previously sought extensions of that trial date 
based on the complexity of the case, and that the government 
had not tactically delayed the trial date, the court rejected 
Stanford’s argument that pretrial release was appropriate.228 
The Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s denial of Stanford’s 
pretrial release, and the United States Supreme Court denied 
certiorari.229 
 
IV. Alternatives to Pretrial Incarceration 
 
When the court finds that pretrial detention is not 
warranted, the 1984 Act provides several options for release, 
from the most lenient—release on personal recognizance—to 
the more stringent imposition of a series of conditions intended 
to ensure that the defendant will not flee or pose a danger to 
the community. The options most often granted include release 
on recognizance, the imposition of a curfew (possibly with 
electronic or GPS monitoring), and home detention. In 
addition, whether the defendant is released on his own 
recognizance or on a more restricted basis, courts almost 
always impose standard conditions of release, such as 
monitoring by Pretrial Services, drug testing, and travel 
restrictions. These conditions, while onerous in their own right, 
are far preferable to detention, and a defendant who is granted 
pretrial release, even on stringent conditions, is in a far better 
position to fight his case and exercise his constitutional rights. 
 
Conclusion 
 
226. United States v. Stanford, 722 F. Supp. 2d 803, 806, 808 (S.D. Tex. 
2010) (internal brackets omitted) (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 
739, 747 (1987)). 
227. The total pretrial incarceration was approximately nineteen 
months. Id. 
228. Id. at 807-11. 
229. Stanford v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1028 (2011); United States v. 
Stanford, 394 F. App’x 72 (5th Cir. 2010). 
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The denial of pretrial release has a profound impact on 
every stage of a defendant’s case, including the ultimate 
outcome. Incarcerated defendants are hampered in their ability 
to assist in their own defense, and are more likely to plead 
guilty and to be sentenced to longer terms of incarceration. In 
providing for preventive pretrial detention based on 
“dangerousness,” as well as the traditional ground of “risk of 
flight,” the 1984 Act shifted the playing field for defense 
attorneys and their clients away from the pursuit of justice and 
toward the expedient resolution of cases. 
Moreover, because more defendants are now increasingly 
likely to be denied pretrial release, the government’s 
bargaining position is enhanced in plea negotiations, where 
incarcerated defendants are promised time off in exchange for 
their cooperation or plea of guilty. Incarcerated pretrial 
defendants, who understand that the time that they are 
serving can only benefit them if they plead guilty, are less 
likely to exercise their right to trial, and more likely to resolve 
the case without full exercise of the constitutional protections 
to which they are entitled. 
As the defense attorneys cited in this Article have 
explained, and in the Authors’ experience, not only is the 
denial of bail on grounds of dangerousness a significant 
impediment to the thorough investigation and defense to which 
every defendant is entitled, it also calls into question the 
ability of the 1984 Act to protect the rights of the defendants 
affected by its provisions. Although the goals of the 1984 Act 
were understandable at the time of enactment, the time has 
come for a reappraisal of the federal bail system and of the 
practical effect of the 1984 Act at all stages of criminal 
prosecution. 
56http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/5
